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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzeS t'he factors that have contributed to the contemporary
of Brazil's national defense strategy. It addresses the role of geopolitics, the
impact of regional economic integration through Mercosur, renewed nationalism,
and the uncertain political realities facing Brazil in the 1990s. Further sections
review the historical role of the Brazilian armed forces, thie fading importance of
the Superior War College, the new civil-military relationships, and the concept of
strategic planning in Brazil. Lastly, it examines the dilemmia facing Brazil's armed
forces in attenmpting to mnove from an internal to external security
orientation. It discusses the military mission to develop and integrate the
Amazon, and argues that this nation-building mission is in its final phase. In
assessing the implications of all these factors, the study Concludes that Brazil is
restructuring its military strategy to demonstrate sovereignty in the Amazon
while aspiring to Occupy the role of regional hegemon.
*TIIC QUlA=Y INMWK.t3 4




I. INTRODUCTION ............. ................... 1
A. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ............ ............. 4
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES ............ ........... 4
II. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GEOPOLITICS ...... ....... 6
A. GEOPOLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE ...... ....... 7
B. THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION .......... ........... 10
C. THE GERMAN INFLUENCE ........... ............. 10
III. GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL ........ .............. 16
A. A HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT . . 17
B. PROFESSOR EVERARDO BACKHEUSER ... ......... .. 20
C. GENERAL MARIO TRAVASSOS .... ............ 23
D. GENERAL GOLBERY DO COUTO E SILVA .. ....... 24
E. GENERAL CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS .. ........ 26
F. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ........... ............ 30
IV. ON REALISM: RECASTING GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL . . 33
A. RECASTING BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICS .......... 34
B. INTEGRATION AT A TIME OF RENEWED NATIONALISM • 41
C. REELING UNCERTAINTIES AND NATIONALISTIC
AUTONOMY ................. ................... 44
iv
V. THE SEARCH FOR A DEFENSE STRATEGY IN BRAZIL . . . . 51
A. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES . . . . 52
B. NATION-BUILDING AND THE SUPERIOR WAR COLLEGE 55
C. FORqA TERRESTRE 1990 (LAND FORCE 1990) . . . . 58
VI. A NEW AGENDA FOR THE MILITARY ..... .......... 62
A. INDICATORS OF CHANGE ....... ............. 64
B. A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH SOCIETY AND CONGRESS . 67
C. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING ......... .. 70
D. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY ...... ............ 75
VII. A GRAND STRATEGY OR SECURITY DILEMMA .. ...... 78
A. PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S MILITARY STRATEGY 79
B. BRAZIL'S MILITARY STRATEGY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AMAZON ............... .................... 83
C. BRAZIL AS AN ASPIRING HEGEMON ... ......... 87
VIII. TOWARDS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY .......... 91
A. BRAZIL'S CHANGING NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY . . 93
B. BRAZIL'S MILITARY: A STRATEGY DILEMMA ..... .. 96
C. CONCLUSION TO BRAZIL'S CHANGING STRATEGY . . . 97
IX. CONCLUSIONS ............... ................... 100
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................. ..................... 104
v
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......... .............. 112
vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brazil's National Defense Strategy: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century
CPT Kenneth S. Lundgren
June 1993
This thesis argues that the military institutions of Brazil are seeking to
regain influence forfeited during the transition to democratic rule. Most
scholars explain this phenomenon in institutional terms - that the military are
seeking to increase their civil-military prerogatives. This study, however,
counters with the hypothesis that the Brazilian military's search for increased
prerogatives is more a reflection of the military's national strategy and the
desire of the armed forces to retain their position as South America's leading
regional power, in conjunction with the Brazilian government's planned
economic integration through Mercosur (which integrates the economies of
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay).
The dilemma for the Brazilian military is that the very concept of
regional integration dilutes their national strategy by eliminating borders and
seeking a parity in force structures between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Paraguay. Many authors argue that the military's region-wide withdrawal
from government has freed civilian leaders to pursue regional integration
regardless of past rivalries. Nevertheless, Brazil's military strategy continues
to be extremely nationalistic, focusing on autonomy and constantly posturing
to strengthen the military's control ever the country's geopolitical activity.
vii
This is in direct contrast to Mercosur, which continues to stumble and falter
with its implementation timetable, allowing the Brazilian military opportunities
to further strengthen their sphere-of-influence through development of the
Amazon Basin.
The thesis is organized with an introduction and three parts. The
introduction discusses the purpose of the study, the major research question,
scope and organization of the study, and the significance of the research. Part
one examines the rise of western geopolitical thought and its impact on
Brazilian scholars and the military institutions. It addresses the significant role
of geopolitics, the impact of regional economic integration through Mercosur,
renewed nationalism, and the uncertain political realities facing Brazil in the
1990s. Part two traces the historical role played by the military in Brazil,
emphasizing their new agenda in civil-military relations, and the military's
search for a national defense strategy. Part three compares the fundamentals
of geopolitics and the national defense strategy against the military
leadership's desire for regional hegemony. It discusses the military mission to
develop and integrate the Amazon, and argues that the military is in its final
phase of this mission. It identifies Brazil's military aspirations, and concludes
that Brazil is restructuring its military strategy to assert sovereignty in the
Amazon, and to occupy the position of regional hegemon.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis argues that the military institutions of
Brazil are seeking to regain influence forfeited during the
transition to democratic rule. Most scholars explain this
phenomenon in institutional terms, that is that the military
is seeking to increase its civil-military prerogatives.' This
study, however, counters with the hypothesis that the
Brazilian military's search for increased prerogatives is more
a reflection of the military's national strategy2 and the
desire of the armed forces to retain their position as South
America's leading regional power.
The military's national strategy needs to be analyzed in
conjunction with the Brazilian government's planned economic
integration through Mercosur (which integrates the economies
of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay). The dilemma for
the military lies in that the very concept of Mercosur dilutes
'see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and
the Southern Cone, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1988), [hereinafter "Stepan (88)"], 93; for a Latin American
perspective see Jorge Zaverucha, "De(ree of Military Political
Autonomy During the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions",
a paper presented at the XVII Latin American Studies Association
Conference, 24-27 September 1992, Los Angeles, California.
2see Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy
for the 1980's, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980), 143. This
study defines Strategy as, "...the part of the political decision
making process that conceptualizes and establishes goals and
objectives designed to protect and enhance national interests in
the international environment".
1
their national strategy by eliminating borders and seeking a
parity in force structures between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay,
and Paraguay. Frequently, Mercosur is prematurely compared to
the European Coal and Steel Community Organization of the
1950's, implying that, like the Western European countries,
once the Southern Cone countries are stripped of their
artificial geopolitical ideolog-.es, a new age of regional
cooperation will spontaneously emerge. Authors are often
quick to point out the military's region-wide withdrawal from
government, and hastily credit this phenomenon with freeing
civilian leaders to pursue regional integration regardless of
past rivalries. Nev.±rtheless, Brazil's military strategy
continues to be extremely nationalistic, focusing on autonomy
and constantly posturing to strengthen its control over the
country's geopolitical activity. This is in direct contrast
to Mercosur, which continues to stumble and falter with its
implementation timetable, allowing the Brazilian military
opportunities to further strengthen their sphere-of-influence
through development of the Amazon Basin. 3
At the theoretical level the primary analytical tool used
will be that of geopolitics- its bearing on Brazil's external
3see "Brazil and Partners Launch MERCOSUR", Latin American
Regional Reports: Brazil Report, 2 May 1991, RB-91-05, 8; also see
"Argentina's Cavallo says extension of Mercosur's Timetable
Inevitable", Latin American Regional Reports: Southern Cone Report,
24 December 1992, RS-92-12, 1.
2
competition for South American hegemony, 4 and its tmpact on
the development patterns in the Amazon. This study will
attempt to analyze Brazil's national military strategy. It
will assess Brazil's search for regional hegemony as the next
logical step beyond economic integration and Mercosur.
This study begins by reviewing historical European
primarily German, and Brazilian geopolitical thought as a
basis for the analysis of contemporary national defense
policies. A cursory review of Brazil's history from the
1900's to the present is examined for evidence of past
geopolitical theories and their relationship to national goals
and aspirations. A review of past relations with the
neighboring countries of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and
Bolivia is also included. To limit the scope of the study,
however, the researcn remains focused on Brazilian
geopolitical thought, and the policies that appear to be
designed to influence Brazil's bid for regional hegemony. The
research results are analyzed to determine implications for
contemporary Brazilian national defense strategy and military
relations among the Southern Cone countries.'
4This study defines hegemony as the act of extending political
and economic influence beyond national borders, and in asserting
regional leadership. Hegemony is frequently mistaken for
imperialism, which is territorial conquest.
5For the purpose of this study the Southern Cone is defined to be Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.
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A. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is organized with an introduction and three
parts. The introduction discusses the purpose of the study,
the major research question, scope and organization of the
study, and the significance of the research. Part one
examines the rise of western geopolitical thcought and its
impact on Brazilian scholars and -he military institutions.
It reviews geopolitical theory in Brazil with sections on
historical background, geopolitical thought and the
perceptions of neighboring Spanish-American states. It also
covers the current internal debate between nationalism and
internationalism, and the uncertain political realities of
1993. Part two traces the past role played by the military in
Brazil, analyzing their new agenda in civil-military relations
and their search for a national defense strategy. Part three
compares the fundamentals of geopolitics and the national
defense strategy against the military leadership's desire for
regional hegemony. It identifies Brazil's military
aspirations, reaches a conclusion on the national defense
strategy for Brazil, its implications for U.S. foreign policy,
and its strategic direction into the twenty-first century.
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
This thesis is based solely on unclassified sources. The
author conducted a research trip to Washington, D.C. in
February 1993. This trip included interviews with military
4
and civilian action officers in the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, The Army Staff,
National War College, and the Department of State. The
research includes materials from the following sources:
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Joint Publication
Research Service, Executive News Service, Latin American
Regional Reports, and various journals, periodicals, and
independent reports.
The research attempts to identify geopolitical concepts
and measure their influence on government. The research
provides insight into the way Brazil might express its
political aspirations in future contexts. In Brazil,
geopolitics has generally focused on internal integration, but
scholars are now suggesting that geopolitics might prcve
useful in analyzing the foreign policy actions of Brazil and
other Southern Cone countries. The results of this study may
contribute to the understanding of how geopolitical theory
influences Brazil's national defense strategy, its regional
relations, and its drive to occupy the dominant leadership
position in the Southern Cone.
5
II. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GEOPOLITICS
The term geopolitics, while not often used in the writings
of North American scholars, has assumed a crucial niche in
contemporary South American political thought. The basic
definition emphasizes the relationship between geography and
politics. However, the popular identification of geopolitics
as a World War II Nazi Germany doctrine has contributed to its
restricted use as First World political theory. As a result,
most North American political scientists view geopolitics as
obsolete, and rarely use the concept. 6
The reasons for the abandonment, or neglect, of
geopolitical analysis by North American writers are obscure at
best. As already noted, geopolitics had been associated with
the expansionist policies of Nazi Germany. Additionally, the
arrival of the nuclear age with its emphasis on international
ballistic missiles, has reduced the perceived influence of
geography on strategic thinking. Finally, as theoretical
approaches have changed over time, it has come to be perceived
as obsolete in academic circles, simply an outdated paradigm.
6As used in this thesis "geopolitics" refers to the dynamic
aspects of those combined geographic and political factors that
influence the options and strategies of a nation's foreign
policies.
6
This explains why, when geopolitics is used in contemporary
works, it is usually in terms of a historical reference. 7
Yet, the most obvious translation of geopolitical theory
into government policy in the post-war, Cold War era is the
United States' containment policy. Thus, the terms used to
describe national strategy, defense policy and national
security policy in the United States seem to encompass
geopolitical terms without directly referring to them.'
A. GEOPOLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
Geopolitics and geopolitical theory are very apparent in
South America's Southern Cone countries, where several
countries have well-developed institutions of geopolitical
thought. In fact, much of the analysis conducted by local
scholars on foreign policy, international relations or
internal development is conducted using geopolitical concepts
and terms. 9 Geopolitical writing is not limited to military
publications, but can also be found in periodicals,
7see James E. Dougherty and Robert H. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,
Contending Theories of International Relations, (New York: Harper
and Row Publishers, 1987), 33-46.
asee George F. Kennan, "X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct",
Foreign Affairs, July 1944, 575. In a later work Kennan was even
more explicit, Realities of American Foreign Policy, (New York:
N.W. Norton Company, 1969), 65.
9see Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in the Southern
Cone: Quarrels Among Neighbors, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner,
1985), [hereinafter "Child (85)"], 3.
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newspapers, and books. An example can be found in Chile,
where former president and current military Commander General
Augusto Pinochet wrote a book on qeopolitics while a professor
at the Army's War Academy.10
The reasons why geopolitical thought and commentary
appears to be flourishing in the Southern Cone can be
attributed to a few significant factors. First, South America
remains a continent of extreme geographic features and
climatic conditions. While this still presents a challenge to
man, modern technology and its machinery are now being used to
exploit resources located in what used to be uninhabited and
often unreachable buffer zones between the Southern Cone
states. This exploitation, particularly in frontier border
areas, is exacerbating old disputes and conflicts as well as
creating new ones."
Second, rapidly growing and poorly distributed populations
are now a significant factor. Some countries have vast areas
of unused or under-used land and the population explosion has
resulted in colonization, often through uncontrolled
emigration, regardless of political borders. This more or
less peaceful fluctuation feeds the states' fear of loss of
sovereignty. Additionally, a growing number of mineral
losee Augusto Ugarte Pinochet, Geopolitica, 3d ed, (Santiago,
Chile: Editorial Ardves Bello, 1977).
lsee United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, International Boundary Study, Brazil-Venezuela
Boundary, no. 175, 17 July 1985.
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resources are in increasing demand on the world market, as is
the product of the narco-traffickers." 2
Third, the Southern Cone still provides an area for the
application of classical geopolitical principles because of
limited air power and non-existent nuclear power. As Lewis
Tambs points out:
The aerial capabilities of the nations of that continent
are slight and their nuclear power non-existent;
consequently the geopolitical analysis of the relationship
between international political power and geographic
setting which was developed prior to World War II is still
applicable."3
Finally, the continued persistence of geopolitics in the
Southern Cone is tied to the region's history of
authoritarian-military regimes. While geopolitical theory is
not a monopoly of the military, it has been the high-level
military schools that have nurtured geopolitical thought and
doctrine, educating civilian elites in the discipline.
12see Jack Child, 'GFopolitical Thinking", in Louis W. Goodman,
Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial, (eds.), The Military and
Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), [hereinafter
"Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial (90)"], 144.
13see Lewis A. Tambs, "Geopolitical Factors in Latin America"
in Norman A. Bailey, (ed.), Latin America: Politics, Economics, and
Hemisphere Security. (New York: Praeger, 1965), 33; also see a
later work by Tambs, "The Changing Geopolitical Balance of South
America," Journal of Social and Political Studifs, [hereinafter
"Tambs (79)"], no. 4, Spring 1979, 17.
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B. THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION
Most of the geopolitical concepts used in the Southern
Cone are directly traceable to European schools of thought
originating in the late nineteenth century. They can be
grouped and categorized in various ways. There are land power
theories, sea power theories, organic state theories,
determinist theories and possibilist theories, all of which
have had some influence on the Southern Cone's geopolitical
thought. However, imperialistic Nazi Germany seems to hold
the dominant position in South American geopolitical thinking.
During the 1990 Brazilian-United States Army staff talks, the
Brazilian delegation presented a briefing that credited the
German army as its primary external patron during the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Thus, German geopolitical
theory has been the driving ideology used by the military in
Brazil and continues to be expressed in their military
doctrine.
C. THE GERMAN INFLUENCE
The German school of geopolitical thought seems to have
coined the concept of political geography. This modern theory
starts with the German political geographer, Friedrich Ratzel
(1844-1904). Ratzel was influenced by Darwin's theory of
evolution, and subsequently pioneered the idea of the state as
a living organism. He set forth a series of laws defining the
expansionist growth of states and the importance of space and
10
sea. Ratzel's concepts viewed the earth geographically,
emphasizing the distribution of life on the earth's surface
and ultimately defining space as a political force that must
be mastered. As a geographer , he embraced the notion that
political decisions were shaped by the geopolitical potential
of the state. In sum, his seven laws are: (1) the space of
states grows with culture, it is only through culture that new
territories are brought under control; (2) the growth of
states follows other manifestations of the growth of people
which must precede the growth of the state, such
manifestations include commercial production and missionary
activity; (3) the growth of states proceeds by the addition of
smaller units, but annexation is not enough - new territory
must be integrated into the state; (4) the frontier is the
periphery organ of the state, it is where growth occurs and is
critical for security of the state. It suffers with all
changes of the state organism, implying that a correction of
the political boundary is necessary when it does not coincide
with the cultural boundary; (5) in their growth, states strive
for the absorption of politically valuable sections such as
coastal regions, river basins, and regions rich in natural
resources; (6) the first ideas of territorial growth comes
from without; and (7) the general tendency toward territorial
ii
annexation and amalgamation spreads from state to state with
increasing intensity."
After World War I, the shock and bitterness arising from
Germany's defeat, which involved the loss of both continental
and colonial territory, deeply affected German geopolitical
thinking. A young army officer, Karl Haushofer, appears to
have been the motivating force and acknowledged leader in
German geopolitical theorizing. After retiring from active
service, Haushofer became a professor of Geography and
Military science at the University of Munich in 1919, and
shortly thereafter founded the "Institute fur Geopolitik".
Some of his concepts concerning political science were that
geopolitical analysis enables one to make political
predictions, and that politicians should always use
geopolitics in establishing their political objectives. He
stressed that geopolitics was a science, to be studied with a
view towards the present and future, not
the past. According to Haushofer, without a solid
geopolitical understanding a state's foreign policy would
forever remain theory and never become reality."
14see Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, (eds.), The
Structures of Political Geography, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1969), 17; the complete text of Ratzel's The Laws of the
Spatial Growth of States, translated by Ronald Bolin.
issee Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer:
Geopolitics in Action, (New York: Kennikat Press, 1966),
[hereinafter "Dorpalen (66)"], 16; also see Derwent Whittlesey,
Chapter 16, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians", in Edward M. Earle,
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military thought from Machiavelli
12
Haushofer was concerned with the mastery of space and the
subsequent distribution of populations on the surface of the
earth. He discussed boundaries, the location of capital
cities, the problems of urbanization, the "drive to the sea",
and oceanism versus continentalism orientation. The following
points characterize his thoughts regarding space: Haushofer
argued that space governs man's history, yet few nations
realize the importance of space planning or adopt their
policies to spatial needs. Therefore the nations of the world
fall into two groups, ones which have more space than they can
master and others which have less space than needed to
adequately feed their population. Haushofer cited the decline
of the Spanish and Portuguese empires as examples of the
inability to master space, and forecasted the disintegration
of the British Empire for the same reason. He argued that the
lack of space mastery was one of the legacies modern South
American states received from their colonial European patrons,
and that this lack was responsible for the territorial losses
of Bolivia, the War of the Pacific, and the continuing
boundary disputes between South American nations. Haushofer
stressed that space was not only an economic and political
aspect but also the greatest military factor of a state.' 6
to Hitler, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1941), 394.
16see Dorpalen (42), 90.
13
In retrospect, some of Haushofer's concepts seem to be as
valid today as when he first wrote about them sixty years ago.
He clearly pointed out the problems of the "haves" and "have
nots" which still persists today, and accurately described the
problems of inadequate space mastery as the cause for boundary
disputes. Haushofer's thinking on border problems reflects
the organismic school of thought. He claimed, as did Ratzel,
that border regions have a life of their own and that the
principles of geopolitik could solve any border issue.
Therefore, a state's boundaries are malleable rather than
rigid, and arbitrary borders drawn in disregard of racial,
geopolitical, or economic needs will continue to be the
primary cause of rebellion. He argued that a central location
of a capital strengthened a nation's internal structure, while
a peripheral position weakened it. He concluded that abnormal
urbanization indicates decay, because it results in a decrease
of population throughout the countryside, thereby causing a
loss of space mastery. Culture, he observed, is the best
indicator of expansion. It advances slowly but establishes
itself permanently."7
Regardless of what influence Haushofer may have had on the
politics of the Third Reich, the German school of geopolitics
is identified with him and may have died with him when he
committed suicide in 1946. Nevertheless, his ideas and
17see Karl Haushofer, "The Call of the Sea", reprinted in
Dorpalen (42), 129.
14
theories can be traced to contemporary South American
geopolitical thought, and many of the problems noted in
Haushofer's writings remain unresolved. The Southern Cone
countries are still attempting to master their space and deal
with increasing urbanization. Border problems are still
causing conflicts while population explosions create new ones.
15
III. GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL'"
Brazil is unique (at least in relation to its neighboring
Spanish-American countries) because of its size, distinctive
racial integration, its colonial heritage, and development
pattern. Brazil is by far the largest country in Latin
America and one of the largest in the world. The country has
a large and rapidly increasing population that is expected to
surpass one hundred and eighty million by the year 2000. But
perhaps the most obvious of these differences is its
Portuguese, or Luso-Brazilian heritage, as opposed to the
Spanish colonial heritage. The old disputes between the
Portuguese and Spanish Empires have persisted throughout
history and flourish in isolated locations today. Part of
Brazil's Portuguese heritage is its historic process of
expansionism, which achieved its greatest gains during the
colonial and early Republic periods. 19
i'see Riordan Roett and Scott D. Tollefson, "Brazil's Status
as an Intermediate Power", Third World Affairv, 1986, 101; also see
Riordan Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and
Geopolitics in the Late 20th Century", Journal of International
Affairs, 29:2, 1975, 139; also see Riordan Roett, "The Changing
Nature of Latin American International Relations: Geopolitical
Realities", in Kolman H. Silvert, (ed.), The America's in a
ChanqinQ World. (New York: The New York Times Book Company, 1975),
95.
19see Lewis A. Tambs, "Geopolitics of the Amazon", in Charles
Wagley, (ed.), Man in the Amazon, (Gainesville Florida: The
University Press of Florida, 1974), 42; also see, "Brazil: A
Country Study", (Washington D.C.: United States Government
Printing Press, 1983).
16
Today, Brazil, because of its history of expansion, its
vast size and aggressive development, is often viewed as the
greatest regional threat by its Spanish-speaking neighbors.
Policies and actions designed for internal development of
Brazil are viewed against this background of threat. Brazil's
expansion across the Tordesillas Line to its present
boundaries is comparable only to the United States' move
westward and Russian's move into Asia. It is unmatched in
South America and has provided the geographical base for a
great nation, even a First World state. 20  Yet, fear of
Brazilian expansion is still present in its neighboring
countries and is a continuing theme in Latin American
political commentary. Today, Brazil is accused of continuing
it9 expansion through economic and cultural penetration,
rather than strictly acquiring territorial gains as in the
past. Thus, foreign policy formulation in Brazil is viewed as
merely incidental to national goals, its actual policies
revealed by actions, and not by public announcements. 2"
A. A HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT
In searching for solutions to the country's problems of
security and development, Brazil has developed a considerable
2 0see Child (85), 42.
21see Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial
Society, 4th ed., (Westport, Connecticut: Praeqer, 1992), 181;
also see Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future
World Power, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), XV.
17
body of geopolitical theory. These geopolitical concepts
flourished under a series of military regimes between 1964-
1985, and are being translated into government policy and
action even today. There are two interesting phenomena
concerning Brazilian geopolitical thought. First, much of the
earlier geopolitical writings were far-reaching in scope,
envisioning Brazil's "Manifest Destiny" in securing access to
the Pacific and in achieving continental hegemony. The second
and more recent geopolitical theorizing is basically internal
and regional in scope. It is designed to care for the
increasing population, to rejuvenate the national security
posture, and to provide the economic and industrial base
needed for Brazil's entry into the First World."
Brazil's geopolitical theories on internal development
have resulted in a cloud of uneasy caution in its neighboring
countries. For example, a road built by Brazil to facilitate
colonization of underdeveloped areas is represented in the
neighboring country's media as an invasion route, or a joint
hydroelectric project is perceived as a bid for regional
hegemony. This reaction is probably heightened by the fact
that Brazil's pragmatic foreign policy has revealed itself in
recent years in a series of bilateral agreements with
neighboring countries. While there are mutual benefits in
2see Child (85), 35; also see Marcia Marques, "Brazilian-
Bolivian Highway Construction Project Detailed", Folha De Sao
Paulo, (in Portuguese), 14 July 1988, D-1, as translated and
reported in JPRS, LAM-88-029, 11 August 1988, 6.
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these bilateral agreements, there are also avenues for
cultural and political penetration by Brazil. 2"
In addition to these formal bilateral agreements, another
phenomenon disturbs Brazil's neighbors. Brazil's population
growth in the South and Southeast has led to considerable
emigration (colonization) into Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, where Brazilians are buying cheap land in
underdeveloped border areas and settling on the land as
farmers. At the same time, Brazil's official policies are
designed to channel people into colonizing the West and the
Amazon basin. When coupled with recent encroachments in the
border areas by the Brazilian military, this migration raises
fears of more Brazilian expansion. 24
Brazilian actions and the perception of them as being
geopolitical in nature only heightens alarm in Argentina,
Brazil's traditional regional rival. Argentina, whose
military experienced a sudden and dramatic removal from their
leadership position following the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war,
are striving to regain lost prestige. Internal political
divisions and problems surrounding economic development
further contribute to Argentina's feeling of inferiority. As
23see G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International
Political System, 2d ed., (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1989), [hereinafter "Atkins (89)"], 77.
24see Alfredo Da Mota Menezes, The Strossner Heritage: A
History of Brazilian-Paraguayan Relation, 1955-1980. Ph.D.
Dissertation, (Tulane University: University Microfilms
International, 1988), [hereinafter "Menezes (84)"], 129.
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a result, much of their contemporary geopolitical theorizing
is devoted to the analysis of the Brazilian threat and to ways
to counteract Brazilian influence. 25
When geopolitical theory arose in the Western world it was
studied by Brazilian scholars and military men who adapted the
principles to the needs of the country, based on clearly-
outlined national goals that were agreed upon by the majority
of elites and translated into policy. Some experts have
argued that geopolitics in Brazil has become
institutionalized, and is centered around three major themes:
the defense of the country; the development of the nation to
include industrialization and colonization of
underpopulated/underdeveloped areas of the country; and the
achievement of great power status by the year 2000.26
B. PROFESSOR EVERARDO BACKHEUSER
Professor Backheuser was a colleague of Germany's Karl
Haushofer. He published a number of articles in Brazilian and
European periodicals, mustering academic support for his new
geopolitical theories. In 1948, the Pontificia Universidade
25see Leslie W. Hepple, "The Geopolitics of the
Falklands/Malvinas and the South Atlantic: British and ArgentinePerceptions, Misperceptions, and Rivalries", in Philip Kelly and
Jack Child, (eds.) Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica,(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1988), [hereinafter "Kelly and
Child (88)"], 223.
26see Philip Kelly, "Traditional Themes of Brazilian
Geopolitics and the Future of Geopolitics in the Southern Cone", in
Kelly and Child (88), 11.
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Catolica (in Rio de Janeiro) created a chair of Geopolitics
for him within the Law Department. 2 7  In his book, he points
out that Brazil had three great geopolitical problems: the
space of Brazil; the location of the capital; and the
territorial division of the country. Backheuser believed that
political space goes through three phases of evolution: the
conquest of space; the defense of the conquered space; and the
valuation of the space possessed. He also developed a theory
for a country's frontiers. He believed that there was a
spontaneous force within states to simplify and shorten
boundaries until they formed a circle, the shape in which the
greatest area is bounded by the least amount of border area.
His theory included a geopolitical formula for defining the
pressurp quotient on a given border. A critical element of
this formula was whether the frontier was "living or dead";
that is, either occupied, translucent, or contended. Under
this concept, the nation exercising the greatest geopolitical
pressure on the frontier would eventually gain territory. A
simplification of his frontier hypothesis is that where two
dead frontier zones adjoin there is little probability of
friction and the frontier should be stable. Where two living
zones meet there is a possibility of friction with a slight
2 7see Cesar N. Caviedes, "The Emergence and Development of
Geopolitical Doctrines in the Southern Cone Countries", in Kelly
and Child (88), 22; also see Everardo Backheuser, Curso de
Geopolitica Geral e do Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do
'Ex~rcito, 1952).
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chance of dislocation of the actual boundary by the stronger
nation, either militarily of diplomatically. However, where
a livinq area meets a dead zone, there is a greater
possibility of invasion of the state whose frontier is a dead
zone, either peacefully, economically or militarily.2 8
Backheuser called for the revitalization of the frontiers
in order to preserve Brazil's national territory. He
advocated the establishment of a comprehensive frontier policy
that would provide for a productive population to cultivate
the land, and establish an industrial nucleus that would
ensure the adequate distribution of the population.
Backheuser stated that the care and defense of the frontier
was the responsibility of the Federal government and not of
the separate states. He clearly defined it as the primary
mission of the Brazilian Army, a task that was originally not
well received by the military. However, his concepts are
recognized as the founding literature in Brazil on
geopolitics, and he is credited with initiating the tradition
of geopolitics actually affecting government policy.2"
Backheuser was, however, only the first of a number of
28see Jack Child; "Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the
1980s," in Jennie ;". Lincoln and Elizabeth G. Ferris (eds.), The
Dynamics of Latin A±-rican Foreign Policies: Challenges for the
1980s, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), [hereinafter
"Lincoln and Ferris (84)"], 31; also see Howard T. Pittman,
Geopolitics in the ABC Countries: A Comparison, Ph.D. Dissertation,
(The American University, Washington D.C.: University Microfilms
International, 1981), [hereinafter "Pittman (81)"], 330.
29see Pittman (81), 339.
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pioneers in Brazilian geopolitics. A few of the other
important thinkers were Mario Travassos, Golbery do Couto e
Silva, and Carlos de Meira Mattos, all of whom were
professional military officers.
C. GENERAL MARIO TRAVASSOS
Mario Travassos argued that Brazil must develop both
internally and externally on an East-West axis, instead of
just along the Atlantic coastline. He called his theory the
"Continental Projection of Brazil": it included the idea of
two antagonistic geographic divisions of the South American
continent, the Atlantic and the Pacific, with the Andes as
the divider between them. On the Atlantic side, most
pertinent to Brazil, there were two more major geographic
features, the Amazon and the Plata river systems. Travassos
recognized that one river was controlled by Brazil and the
other controlled by Argentina, which further emphasized the
geopolitical importance of Bolivia's plateau or Altiplano. He
identified the Altiplano as Sir Halford Mackinders "Heartland"
of South America; 3` it enjoyed access to both river systems
as well as the mountain pass through the Andes to the Pacific
coast beyond. He believed that the Southern Cone country that
30see Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations:
Frameworks For UnderstandinQ, 3d ed., (New York: MaCmillan
Publishing Company, 1991), 10.
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controlled this area would dominate Latin American
politics."
In order to achieve this domination, Travassos proposed a
two-pronged East-West drive into the heartland. This would
ultimately provide Bolivia access to the Atlantic and Brazil
access to the Bolivian plateau and Pacific ports. One axis
would be via the Amazon river system, and the other would be
via a railroad that would connect Santa Cruz de La Sierra to
Corumbd, forming a triangle and offering Brazil a direct trade
route that would cut across the Argentine approach from the
South via the Plata river system. This symbolic triangle also
included a series of interconnecting road and river routes.
This same geopolitical concept is being used today by the
Brazilian government in its contemporary economic and
political penetration of Bolivia. It is also why Brazil
continues to support Bolivian attempts in regional conferences
to regain access to the Pacific."
D. GENERAL GOLBERY DO COUTO E SILVA
The late General Golbery do Couto e Silva was one of the
best known modern Brazilian geopolitical theorists. As an
Army officer, he was the founder and first director of the
31see Bernardo Quagliutti de Bellis, "The La Plata Basin in
the Geopolitics of the Southern Cone", in Kelly and Child (88),
130; also see Mario Travassos, Projeg&o Continental do Brasil, 4th
ed., (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1947).
32see Kelly and Child (88), 132.
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National War College (ESG), where his ideas were very
influential. In addition, he was a member of every military
government and was able to translate his theories into
action." In November of 1966, General Golbery was sent
to Paraguay, to close the rift between the two countries. His
charge was to play down Brazil's military move into a
contested border areas and propose the development of a joint
hydroelectric project. These talks were the beginning of the
Itaipu hydroelectric project, the world's largest power
plant. 34
Golbery considered geopolitics the primary factor in the
development of the state and in the formulation of national
security policies. He argued that geopolitics could not be a
substitute for national strategy, but could be translated into
the aspirations of the national conscience and provide popular
support for governmental programs. Golbery's work divided
Brazil into a central nucleus, the Northeast, the South, the
West Central peninsula and the island of Amazona."
General Golbery identified three goals: the defense of the
frontier and need for development throughout the country; the
integration of the West Central peninsula as a base for the
"Brazil was under military rule from 1964 to 1985, during
which time five army generals acted as successive presidents.
34see Menezes (84), 59.
"35see Armin K. Ludwig, "Two Decades of Brazilian Geopolitical
Initiatives and Military Growth", Air University Review, July-
August 1986, 57.
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movement in the Amazon and blocking Argentine imperialism; and
the integration of the Amazon into the country. In Golbery's
analysis, Brazil held the key both to control of the continent
and of the South Atlantic, but to exercise this power the
country had to be fully integrated and developed. To reach
that point he proposed the following sequence of events: (1)
in phase one, to link the Northeast and the South to the
central nucleus to provide the economic base for Travassos's
"continental projection"; (2) in phase two, to stimulate
colonization to the Northwest in order to integrate the west
central peninsula into Brazil; (3) in phase three, and
starting from the established base in the west central under
the guise of frontier outposts (defense points), to flood the
Amazon basin with civilization in an East-West movement
primarily along the river axis, descriptively coined as a
fluvial strategy. 36
E. GENERAL CARLOS DE MEIRA MATTOS
General Carlos de Meira Mattos has succeeded General
Golbery as Brazil's primary geopolitical theorist. Like
Golbery, he was a successful military officer educated in the
Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG - Superior War College) system.
Unlike Golbery, however, he envisions the development of
Brazil's power base as a foundation for world-class power as
36see Pittman (81), 348; also see Golbery do Couto e Silva,
Geopolitica do Brasil, (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1967).
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well as regional hegemony. To accomplish these lofty goals he
advocates the educating of elites, the development of
geopolitical policies for energy and transportation programs,
and the bilateral development of border areas with neighboring
countries, which he called "poles". He seeks to expand on
the earlier work of Travassos, noting that Brazil was a
continental as well as a maritime country. Though a robust
maritime infrastructure existed, internal land conructions
need to be built. Mattos' writings are possibilist in nature,
statinq that Brazil's geography offers the possibility of
manifest destiny, but the people of Brazil must desire it
above all else."
In assessing Brazil's world power status, Mattos argues
that Brazil possessed all the ingredients for great power
status and could reach that goal by the year 2000. Its assets
include a vast territory bordering on ten countries, the
longest coastline in the South Atlantic and an abundance of
natural resources. Mattos often ties his analysis to the
theory of interior space integration, complete with a national
road network and the development of nuclear power. He
concedes that the drive for nuclear power will exacerbate
"37see Philip Kelly, "Geopolitical Themes in the Writings of
General Carlos de Meira Mattos of Brazil", Journal of Latin
American Studies, [hereinafter "Kelly (84)"], 16 November 1984,
453.
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rivalries and past antagonisms, but believes these goals are
necessary to becoming a great power. 3"
In 1977, while stationed in Washington as Deputy Director
for the Inter-American Defense College, Mattos turned in his
writings from the geopolitical development of national power
to the projection of power. He stated that the modernization
of a society is a factor of power projection, and
differentiated between development and modernization.
Development is the end goal, while modernization is the means
of reaching it. 3 9 A summary of his most prominent ideas are
as follows: (1) Brazil is a great but vacant country, only
Argentina has less population in relation to territory in
South American; (2) Brazil has good maritime connections with
other countries, but its continental lines of communications
need to be improved through an aggressive road network to
neighboring countries; (3) new natural resources are being
discovered in the sea, Antarctica, and the Amazon which must
be controlled and exploited by Brazil; (4) Brazil spends too
little on national defense, with only a very small percentage
of its population in the armed forces; and (5) Brazil has
38see Kelly (84), 458.
"39see Atkins (89), 67.
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great unity where national interests, projects, and
geopolitical aspirations are involved.4"
General Mattos convincingly argues that for 200 years
Brazil has tried to conquer the interior through a fluvial
strategy, and has failed. This strategy began to change in
the 1960's; th2 change called for conquering the Brazilian
central plateau, establishing an interior capital, and then
linking the interior with a road network that would free the
country from the constraints of river and sea lines of
communication. Mattos continues to extend his concepts into
the entire Amazon region with an eye towards integrated
development through the 1978 Amazon Pact.
The Amazon region includes two-fifths of the South
American continent; of this 69 percent belongs to Brazil.
Mattos further stipulates that there is a natural tie between
the Amazon and Andean Pacts because five countries, Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are members of both.
Brazil sees itself as the bridge country between these two
pacts, in the role of the fulcrum actor. Some have called
Brazil the champion of regional integration for its role in
the Amazon Pact and ties with the Andean nations. Others see
this as simply a tactical move to ensure Brazil's access to
the resources of its neighbors as well as access to the
40see Pittman (81), 364; also see Kelly (84), 453; also see
Carlos de Meira Mattos, A Geopolitica e as Proieg6es do Poder, (Rio
de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1977).
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Pacific. Whether or not these actions represent a change in
Brazilian geopolitical thought from nationalism to
internationalism, an interesting side note is that in December
1992, President Itamar Franco announced his intention of
inviting the seven Amazonian countries to join Brazil in
forming a new regional organization, tentatively named
"Merconorte". This new pact would further integrate Mercosur,
the Andean Pact, the Group of Three41 and incorporate Guyana
and Suriman into a continental cooperative. 42
F. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 43
The mainstream of Brazilian geopolitical theory has been
intensely nationalistic despite more recent proposals for
integration and joint development of the Amazon. The
Brazilians prefer to work out issues on a bilateral basis,
using Brazil as the fulcrum. 4 Contemporary Brazilian
"
41The "Group of Three" includes Mexico, Colombia, andVenezuela; its primary charter is to promote trade and economic
cooperation between members.
42see "Franco To Propose Regional Trade Agreement", (in
Portuguese), 0 Globo, 15 December 1992, 25, translated and reportedin FBIS, LAT-92, 242, 16 December 1992, 32; also see "Merconorte",
Latin American Weekly Reports, 7 January 1993, WR-93-01, 12.
43see Jack Child, "The Status of South American Geopolitical
Thinking," in G. Pope Atkins (ed.), South America into the 1990's:
Evolving International Relationships in a New Era, (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1990), 73.
44see United States Army Sectional Message, R162036Z MAR 92,
SUBJECT: BR-364 Paved as far as Acre, American Embassy Brasilia,
Brazil, 1992, 1.
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geopolitical theory is more devoted to the development of
under-utilized internal territory and the defense of borders
rather than economic integration with its neighbors through
Mercosur or Merconorte. The greatest geopolitical results
have been seen in the development of transportation and
communications networks, and in the creation of "poles" to
encourage the development and internal migration to previously
unoccupied areas. Behind this development lies the greater
goal of transforming Brazil. into a world power, and in
achieving regional hegemony. Thus, while the focus has
changed from an initial emphasis on security to the current
emphasis on development, this focus is again expected to
reverse itself as higher levels of development are reached.4
Brazilian geopolitical thinking is an important phenomenon
but one that is little understood in strategic circles outside
of the region. Although closely associated with the military
regimes, geopolitical planning is not the exclusive property
of the military, and as such has n( disappeared with thle
advent of elected democratic governments. Geopolitical
thinking is closely tied to the deep currents of nationalism
and patriotism, and thus has the tendency to endure regardless
of regime type.
There are no guarantees that future Brazilian governments
will continue the geopolitical orientation of their
45 Ibid., 2.
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predecessors. Over time, however, Brazilian leaders have
followed geopolitical goals in spite of other ideological
differences. If the past is any guide to the future, it is
reasonable to expect this trend to continue. The pendulum is
currently swinging towards increased nationalism under Itamar
Franco's administration, converging with many of the more
traditional aspects of the military's national defense
strategy. The ideology and history of Brazilian geopolitics
has permeated the media and school system, exposing much of
the population to its tenets. As a result of this wide
exposure and converging governmental forces, Brazil's national
consciousness is bubbling with the spirit of a new bid for
regional hegemony.46
"46see David J. Myers (ed.), Regional Hegemons: Threat
Perception and Strategic Response, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991),
[hereinafter "Myers (91)"], 225; also see John Child, "Inter-State
Conflict in Latin America in the 1980's", in Lincoln and Ferris
(84), 32.
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IV. ON REALISM: RECASTING GEOPOLITICS IN BRAZIL4 7
This portion of the thesis seeks to recast geopolitics as
an analytical concept for the study of Brazil's defense
strategy. It is no coincidence that geopolitics found its
most avid supporters in Southern Cone countries. Though all
Southern Cone countries continued to expand after independence
and each lost some territory in disputes and settlements,
Brazil is the undisputed champion in land acquisition.
It is this lasting and often bitter impression left by the
pattern of expansion in the past century that has affected the
Southern Cone most strongly. Brazil is perceived as
expansionist and a threat to its neighbors, particularly when
the dominating ideology is overtly nationalistic as in the new
Itamar Franco administration. Thus, Brazil's search for
autonomy and regional power are a result of the military's
perception of threat which, though largely non-tangible, is
focusing less on regional neighbors and more on international
organizations."
47see Gamaliel Perruci, "The Reshaping of Geopolitics in the
Southern Cone", a paper presented at the XVII Latin American
Studies Association Conference, 24-27 September 1992, in Los
Angeles, California. The author has drawn heavily from this paper
and is indebted to this previous work by Perruci.
48see Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin
America, trans. by Paul E. Sigmund, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987),[hereinafter "Rouquie (87)"], 35; also see
Christian Church World Council, Directive Brazil no. 4, (Geneva:
July 1991), 1, which emphasizes the following guidance to their
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Earlier sections focused entirely on a review of Brazilian
geopolitical theories that have paved the way into the 1990's,
helping to establish the current national defense strategy in
Brazil. However, in the process of analyzing these
geopolitical theories and then recasting them against a
contemporary background, a different picture begins to emerge.
A. RECASTING BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICS
Brazil's internal geopolitical structure today does not
resemble that of an expanding United States trying to populate
a relatively uncontested and habitable continent in the
nineteenth century. Instead, Brazil resembles Australia or
China, which must continually develop links between strong
littoral regions and an empty, harsh interior. Thus, Karl
Haushofer's theories on space occupy a significant position in
the development of Brazil's geopolitical thought and
contemporary policies in the development of the Amazon. In
recasting Haushofer's concepts today, a single recurring
aspect is exposed, revealing Brazil's greatest geopolitical
threat: demographics. Brazil has a rapidly expanding
population, normally considered a positive aspect in a country
Amazon missionaries - "The entire Amazon...is considered by us a
patrimony of humanity. Ownership of this vast area by mentioned
countries is merely circumstantial..."; also see "G-7 Support for
Rain Forest Project: Critics say Industrialized Countries Eyeing
Amazon Riches", Latin American ReQional Reports-Brazil, 15 August
1991, RB-91-07, 4, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois
Mitterrand state that Brazil should be recognized as having only
relative sovereignty over the Amazon.
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with vast unused territory. When the population distribution
is compared with Brazil's demographics, however, it is obvious
that Brazil is chronically suffering from abnormal
urbanization, one of Haushofer's signs of decay. In 1950, 36
percent of the population lived in cities; by 1990 over 75
percent were urbanized. Thus, the heavy stream of migration
from the countryside to the cities has further exacerbated
Brazil's inability to master its space.
The United Nations Population Fund issued an annual report
in September 1992, categorizing Latin America as having one of
the fastest growing populations in history, and as being
hopelessly unprepared to deal with this population explosion.
The most conservative estimates place the ranks of the poor in
Latin America at 46 percent of the population, and the
continued urbanization cannot support this population pattern
(Brazil's projected growth rate from 1993 through 1995 is 2.7
percent per year). 50  On the one hand, populating Brazil's
empty spaces is seen as a prerequisite for achieving great
power status. On the other, Brazil fears that demands from
the rapidly growing population will hinder the country's
ability to assemble the capital necessary for industrial and
technological modernization.
49see Ronald M. Schneider, Order and Progress: A Political
History of Brazil, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 6.
50see The United Nations, Trade and Development Report, 1992,
the Secretariat of the United Nations conference on trade and
development, (New York: United Nations Publications, 1992), 1211.
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Everardo Backheuser discussed three geopolitical problems
in Brazil. Two of the problems, the location of the capital
and the territorial division of the country, have long since
been accomplished. The mastery of Brazil's space remains
unresolved, though the problem is being addressed through the
government's programs in the Amazon. The Amazon is Brazil's
last frontier area; the military will have completed its
transition from a primarily internal security orientation to
an external strategic perspective once the Amazon space has
been successfully integrated. The military's own acceptance
of its institutional mission in the Amazon is changing the
border relations as described by Backheuser's frontier
formula. In his terms, previous dead zones that have enjoyed
relative stability are being modified into living zones.
These new living zones converge upon neighboring states' dead
zones, opening the way for cultural, economic, and military
penetration. Military institutions are creating this change
in the frontier buffer zones as part of their strategy for
ensuring regional hegemony.
In May 1974, Brazil agreed to assist Bolivia in creating
a "pole of development" in the Santa Cruz area, east of the
Andes. The Santa Cruz-Corumbd railroad was completed in 1979,
thereby creating Mario Travassos's symbolic triangle. On 16
February 1993, Presidents Itamar Franco and Jaime Paz Zamora
(Bolivia) signed a 20-year contract for Bolivia to supply gas
to Brazil, to begin in 1996. The project involves the
36
construction of a 2,233 kilometer pipeline. The project will
only be implemented after the dissolution of a similar but
much smaller volume contract between Argentina and Bolivia."
Additionally, General Golbery's proposal for integration and
development are in their final phase as the civilization of
the Amazon Basin begins to materialize. In a paper presented
to the U.S. Army War College on 1 April 1992, Brazilian
Lieutenant Colonel Paulo Cesar Azevedo clearly indicated that
Brazil was in the final stage of its grand "geopolitical
maneuver", linking the "Amazon island" to the rest of
Brazil.52
This final phase of the military's strategy became obvious
in the 1970's with the launching of the "Super-Brasil da
Amazonas"" project in the Northwest territories, and
subsequent launching of the "Calha Norte" program in the
Amazon in 1985. 5 The Super-Brasil da Amazonas and Calha
Norte projects grew from the geopolitical work associated with
51see "At Last, the Gas Deal with Bolivia", Latin American
Weekly Report, 4 March 1993, WR-93-09, 98.
52see Lieutenant Colonel Paulo Cesar Miranda de Azevedo,
"Security of the Brazilian Amazon Area", Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, 1 April 1992, 33.
"53see Lea Tarbutton, "The Calha Norte Project: Brazil's Armed
Forces Modernization", Armies of the World, [hereinafter "Tarbutton(91)"], United States Army Intelligence Agency and Threat Analysis
Center, January-June 1991, ATC-RD-2600-072-90, 21.
54see "Calha Norte", Brazilian Army Public Affairs Release,
1989; also see Lieutenant Mike Ryan, Calha Norte: Explainina
Brazilian Army Presence in the Amazon, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1993.
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the idea of space mastery. Both projects were designed to
ensure the consolidation of the frontier areas and the
eventual projection of Brazil's military into South America's
core. According to Brazilian scholars, these projects were
developed and executed for geopolitical reasons as Brazil
began to recognize the concept of space as defined by
Haushofer and Golbery. The completion of these projects
conquers and defends the space of the frontier, and is another
step towards Brazilian domination of South America's
"Heartland", the Bolivian Altiplano plateau.
Finally, General Mattos' writings address Brazil's drive
for nuclear power. Given the nation's reliance on foreign
sources for more than two-thirds of its petroleum
requirements, and the impact of the 1973 price increases,
Brazil sought to reduce its vulnerability in this area. It
intensified exploration for domestic supplies and even
substituted alcohol, produced from sugar cane, for
gasoline."5  In the foreign arena Brazil first sought oil
from other Latin American countries. Brazil then recognized
that Third World oil producers wanted arms without political
strings, and stimulated the development of a sophisticated
arms industry.
55see "Another Good Year in 1992: But Warnings about Risks in
1993", Latin American Weekly Report, 7 January 1993, WR-93-01, 7.
The warning came from Mexico's energy minister stating that overall
Latin American demand for crude oil would outstrip regional
production, reinforcing the Middle Eastern connection (Iran) for
Brazil.
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Brazil's past armament customers include Libya and Iraq,
with Iran being the newest Middle Eastern country expressing
a desire to trade oil for arms. The Brazilians want back into
the arms trade business, but at a higher level of technology
than in the past.5 6  Brazil's greatest obstacle is the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) countries, which
continue to block Brazil's access to technology it claims it
needs for peaceful development. The MTCR's rationale cites
Brazil's continued refusal to sign the non-proliferation
treaty, and its lack of an end-use policy. Brazil argues that
the non-proliferation treaty discriminates against those
countries that do not already possess nuclear weapons, and is
therefore illegal and destined for failure.5 7
Since 1975, Brazil has had a multibillion dollar agreement
with West Germany to develop eight nuclear power plants in
exchange for supplies of uranium. Brazil initially stated
that its acquisition of nuclear technology would support its
peaceful energy needs. However, the geopolitical realities of
the region immediately led to an arms race for nuclear
56see "Purchase of 200 MiG-29 Combat Planes Denied", (in
Portuguese), 0 Estado De Sao Paulo, 7 December 1992, 14, translated
and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 235, 7 December 1992, 32; also see
William Waack, "State Company Seeks Russian Missile Technology", 0
Estado De Sao Paulo, 6 December 1992, 14, translated and reported
in FBIS, LAT-92, 235, 7 December 1992, 32.
57see "Bid to Free Arms Trade From Curbs", Latin American
Weekly Report, 28 January 1993, WR-93-04, 38; also see "New U.S.
Missile Rules", Latin American Regional Report-Brazil, 9 July 1992,
RB-92-06, 8.
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technology with Argentina. Until recently, this was the
primary security concern of the United States with the region.
This Argentine-Brazilian rivalry grew to include the supplying
of conventional weapons to the buffer states of Uruguay,
Paraguay and Bolivia by both countries. Brazil's nuclear bomb
program was officially halted by President Collor in 1991 but
the subject continues to surface, leading many experts to
speculate that the program simply went secret."8
In related developments, Brazil continues to build a space
launch vehicle with long-range missile potential, and has also
resumed construction of the Angra II nuclear power plant after
almost ten years. The decision to restart the program was
made after Collor's departure, and with the appointment of the
new director of the Secretariat for Strategic Planning (SAE),
former Navy minister and a leader of Brazil's nuclear program,
Admiral Mario Cesar Flores. The required equipment has
already arrived in Brazil from Germany, and the power plant is
expected to be operational by 1997. In a similar vein, the
Navy continues to publicly announce its desire to christen a
nuclear submarine by 2005.59
58see "Computer Thefts Said to Expose Nuclear Secrets" and
"Parallel Program Revival", (in Portuguese), Isto E Senhor, 11
November 1992, 28-30, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 235,
7 December 1992, 34.
59see Leonard S. Spector, "Repentant Nuclear Proliferants",
Foreign Policy, no. 8, Fall 1992, 21; also see "Brazil; Industry &
Trade, and Nuclear Power", Latin American Weekly Reports, 28
January 1993, WR-93-04, 38.
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B. INTEGRATION AT A TIME OF RENEWED NATIONALISM
The end of the Cold War has accentuated the general
anxiety among Southern Cone policy-makers concerning the
emerging patterns of regional-level conflicts. On a global
level, they are paying close attention to the way regional
players are flexing their muscles and attempting to redraw the
geopolitical landscape. This portion of study, therefore,
focuses on the glaring contrasts between emerging cooperation
and prevailing nationalism."6
In Mercosur's nearly two years of existence, there has
been a notable increase in trade between the pact's major
trade partners. In Argentina this has translated into a huge
bilateral trade deficit with Brazil, resulting in the loss by
the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange of all the gains it made since
late 1991. Argentine businessmen have been demanding that the
government enact protectionist measures against Brazilian
imports. They complain that Argentine companies are unable to
compete with Brazil on equal terms, claiming that Brazilian
companies receive governmental export incentives, subsidized
financing, and benefits from their undervalued currency. In
response to these complaints, Argentina's economy minister has
simply stated that the advantages enjoyed by Brazil in
bilateral trade agreements are only temporary and will
60see "Zoroastro Document Scoring Government Excerpted: World
Affairs and the Brazilian Situation", (in Portuguese), Gazeta
Mercantil, 18 November 1992, 6, translated and reported in FBIS,
LAT-92, 239, 11 December 1992, 27.
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dissolve once Mercosur is operational, completely eliminating
any current inequalities. Mercosur would then result in an
Argentine victory as the country penetrated Brazil's economic
barriers."
While the movement toward economic integration has been
acu- ierated by the demise of military governments and the end
of the Cold War, the United States continues to play a vital
role in shaping the hemispheric agenda. As the United States
lessens its geopolitical pressure on Latin America, no longer
seeking a close alignment against the Soviet Union, the
Southern Cone countries are free to pursue their own policies.
There is room for exaggeration and false hope concerning
Mercosur's ability to foster solid cooperation in the Southern
Cone. But if economics is replacing geopolitics as a tool of
power, as some analysts have suggested, competition for
economic spheres-of-influence will drive the integration
agenda and the United States will continue to play a
significant role in the region. At the end of World War II
the United States called on the other American republics to
form the inter-American system to contain the Soviet Union.
The United States will again call on those same republics to
unite against the rising economic tide of a Japan-led Asia and
61see "Mercosur Threatened by Argentina's Move to Curb Imports
form Brazil", Latin American ReQional Reports-Southern Cone Report,
19 November 1992, RS-92-09, 1; also see "Argentine Package will
Disturb Relations", (in Portuguese), Folha De Sao Paulo, 30
November 1992, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 214, 4
November 1992, 41.
42
German-lead European Economic Community. The need for North
American participation in any regional cooperative effort
means that Mercosur could be overshadowed by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agenda. 62
The prospect of the current cooperative spirit taking on
an institutional form lies in part on Chile's decision not to
join Mercosur, and in Argentine President Carlos Menem's
acknowledgment that he does not rule out his country's future
participation in NAFTA. The momentum of economic integration
lies in NAFTA, not Mercosur. 6 3 The post-Cold War collapse of
the inter-American security system has simply meant the
reorientation of the strategic agenda toward trade bloc
politics. The new civilian leaders have introduced a liberal
economic agenda, reflecting the tradition of a weak civilian
state amid powerful economic interests. In this sense,
Mercosur is simply replicating the strategic tenets of the
1947 Rio Treaty, in which the American republics defined the
hemispheric principles of collective security. Collective
economic security is becoming a prominent factor in regional
foreign policy making. It remains to be seen whether this
effort will take an institutional form. It should not
surprise anyone, however, if the United States takes a
62see Keith Bradsher, "Free Trade Accord for North America is
Expected Today", The New York Times, 12 August 1992, Al.
63see "Argentina Interested in NAFTA Links but Not Pulling Out
of Mercosur", Latin American Reqional Reports-Southern Cone Report,
15 October 1992, RS-92-08, 1.
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dominant role in organizing the hemispheric economic bloc to
counter global developments. NAFTA will be setting the agenda
in relation to hemispheric integration, and the United States
will control NAFTA. 64
In summary, the near term impact of transitioning to a
democratic government with its plans of increasing economic
cooperation may have temporarily curtailed Brazil's ability to
project influence throughout South America. The sheer
magnitude of the domestic social-economic demands have
dampened Brazil's role as an uncontested regional hegemon, at
least for the short term. Ironically, the many fears
expressed by analyst during the military regimes have come to
the surface after they left power. The military presided over
the creation of an industrial base capable of supporting their
aspirations of achieving great power status. However, the
social disorganization and economic liabilities that the
civilian elected presidents inherited mandated that they
concentrate on domestic problems as their first priority, and
not blindly continue in the military's path towards great
power status.
C. REELING UNCERTAINTIES AND NATIONALISTIC AUTONOMY
Brazilians have long viewed South America as a region in
which their country is destined to exercise the dominant
"64see Robert Pastor, "The Latin American Option", Foreign
Policy, no. 88, Fall 1992, 107.
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influence. During the 1950's, military geopoliticans, the
strongest advocates of this perspective defined and analyzed
Brazil's internal and external South American strategies.
With the return of civilian governments, foreign service
officers and academics have participated increasingcf in tLe
debate over national security policy. One striking result has
been the downplaying of geopolitical perspectives between
Brazil and Argentina's civilian presidents, who have stressed
economic, political and military cooperation. Nevertheless,
the military throughout the Southern Cone continue to be
concerned with regional spheres-of-influence. 6 5
In spite of growing capabilities and new leadership
opportunities, Brazil continues to be contested for regional
leadership by Argentina. Brazil's industrial and
technological development continues to be selective and
concentrated in the south detracting from Brazil's ability to
project power and influence beyond its frontiers.
Furthermore, the signatories to the Amazon treaty are
displaying mixed feeling towards Brazil. They are
apprehensive over the long range implications of further
integrating in the Amazon basin development, such as with the
Merconorte pact. At the Manaus summit of 1989, eleven years
after singing the Amazon Pact T- ity, these countries rejected
65see Wayne A. Selcher, "The National Security Doctrine and
Policies of the Brazilian Government", Parameters, VII, no. 1,
1977, 10.
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Brazil's proposal for "multinational conditionalities" in the
exploitation of Amazoi! resources. The fear is that integrated
regional development may threaten their national sovereignty
over their largely vacant frontiers."6
Brazil's potential continues to be tempered by the
enormous internal problems that continually thwart aspirations
for regional hegemony. These problems are primarily economic
and social, with wide-spread dissatisfaction with past
governmental performance. By mid-1993, Itamar Franco's
policies received only a mediocre reception; the era of
presidents with imperial powers is over, and congressional
leaders openly taunt Franco's policies as little more than a
list of good intentions. 67
The World Bank reports that Brazil still possesses the
largest inequities of income distribution in the world, with
the richest one percent of the population earning as much as
the poorest 50 percent. The Franco administration is hinting
at a new approach to Brazil's economic and social problems,
putting poverty relief before the demands of foreign
creditors. Brazil is truly at a cross road, no doubt blinded
by the oncoming lights of enormous social problems. The
impulse to regroup in a purely nationalistic position is
66see "Apprehensions over Amazon Treaty", Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, 1 June 1989, RB-89-05, 4.
67see "Franco Unveils his New Programme: Reactivation, Social
Safety Net and Job Creation", Latin American Weekly Report, 14
January 1993, WR-93-02, 14.
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virtually irresistible, and the reality is that Brazil is
stumbling with its national identity. Despite repeated past
failures with its nationalistic-orientated policies, Brazil is
returning to its old position of internal political balance.
Two of the most influential historical ideas in the Southern
Cone are the opposing concepts of nationalism verses
internationalism. These schools of thought seem to alternate
as the dominant ideology affecting both internal affairs and
regional relations. However, internationalism is primarily a
Spanish-American concept and not a Brazilian one. originating
in the struggle for independence it characterized the ideas of
Simon Bolivar and San Martin. In recent years
internationalism has been translated into the concept of
intergrationalism, and specifically labeled as Mercosur."
In Brazil, internationalism has rarely been the dominant
foreign policy posture. Nationalistic autonomy has been the
rule, with the single goal of making Brazil a major power.
Brazil has always pursued its own national interests,
preferring bilateral agreements to multilateral ones. Though
Brazil has joined multilateral groups in recent years, it
continues to pursue its own course from within these groups.
Even in initiating the Amazon Pact, Brazil's actions seem to
indicate that it was designed to ensure the protection of
68 see "President Franco Warned of Possible Isolationism", (in
Portuguese), 0 Estado De Sao Paulo, 22 November 1992, 3, translated
and reported in.FBIS, LAT-92, 227, 24 November 1992, 24.
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Brazilian interest, forestall blocks against Brazil, assure
its leadership role in the region, and counter Argentine
influence in the Plata river basin.
The historical roots of Brazil's nationalism can be traced
back to the colonial era, when native elites began to develop
a sense of separate identity from Portugal. The more
contemporary forms of nationalism stem from the values
nurtured during the nation-building processes and through
political/economic modernization. The subsequent rise of a
new social class in Brazil has also stimulated nationalistic
sentiments on a broad level, challenging the traditional elite
power structures.69
The school of political realism provides invaluable
analysis into the geopolitical perspective of Brazil's desire
for nationalistic autonomy. It is particularly helpful in
explaining the chemistry of Third World political dealings
with First World countries and their international
nongovernmental organizations that function as their
surrogates. Obviously, Third World countries like Brazil are
behaving the way states have always behaved, attempting to
maximize their power and their ability to control their own
destinies. Beyond the most basic objective of preserving
territory and political integrity which all states share,
Brazil seeks to maximize both wealth and political control.
69see Atkins (89), 64.
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If a choice must be made between political control and wealth,
realists contend that Third World states will overwhelmingly
opt for political control since it is the more enduring of the
two. 0
In sum, by focusing on the evolution of Brazilian
policies, one could argue that the thrust of Brazilian
policies has recently shifted away from an internationalistic
base to the more traditional nationalistic position. Economic
objectives may still be the primary means for diplomacy, but
political and military objectives are beginning to reappear in
Brazil's policies. The recent reorientation of Brazilian
national politics has put economic policy at the service of
political objectives espoused by Franco in the form of new
social programs. The overall amount of effort devoted to
foreign policy has diminished significantly, with national
resources being even more narrowly concentrated on the
national and regional level, with only a few global issues
being seriously considered. On the global level, the
internationalization of the Amazon is still a high priority in
Brazil. In this region, Brazil can be expected to follow
pragmatic polices tailored to national capabilities, with the
expectation that these policies will increase Brazilian
control over national destiny - a destiny that Brazilian
70see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World
Against Global Liberalism, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985), 12.
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geopoliticans argue will bestow a large measure of regional
hegemony upon their country during the twenty-first
century."
71see Child (85), 35.
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V. THE SEARCH FOR A DEFENSE STRATEGY IN BRAZIL
The balance of power in the Southern Cone has been the
object of considerable attention due to the distribution and
location of military units along borders. In the twentieth
century, border disputes and saber rattling between these
states reflected the continual shifting of this balance of
power. Many experts acknowledge that a probable reason for
these disputes was that many of the Latin American countries
were slow to acquire the essential characteristics of
sovereign states.7
Regardless of previous altercations, the Cold War had a
crystallizing effect on U.S. policies towards the Southern
Cone countries. These policies were oriented toward the
struggle between the forces of the West and the forces of
International Communism under the geopolitical concept of
containment. As a result, geopolitics rose in popularity
among the Brazilian military thinkers and reflected the way
the United States approached its sphere-of-influence. In the
event of penetration or general war between these two powers,
Brazil was supposed to play a role in defending the South
Atlantic space. 7 3
72see Tambs (79), 17.
73se, Gerald K. Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study
of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954,
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), 21.
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In the first decade of the Cold War, geopolitics dominated
the character of the United States-Brazilian alliance, with
General Golbery do Couto e Silva as the master of ceremony.
Military strategic thought reflected the U.S. program
throughout Latin America of a continental defense against a
possible Soviet invasion. The geographic importance of Brazil
was recognized within the military as an essential component
of U.S. global strategy. Brazil's geographic position gave it
natural command over the entrance to the North Atlantic
through the Recife-Dakar corridor. However, the end of the
Cold War means that a significant portion of the East-West
external missions are obsolete. This obsolescence has
unfortunately come at a time of economic chaos and social
mobilization throughout the Southern Cone. Rather than revert
back to old rivalries, Southern Cone countries are attempting
to strengthen their level of cooperation."4
A. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES
The first convergence of economic and military power
reached its apogee at the end of the 19th century, when
Southern Cone exports boomed and the state bureaucracy was
called on to guarantee the economic order. The state's main
task was to maintain the flow of agricultural products and raw
74see Orlando Bonturi, Brazil: and the Vital South Atlantic,
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Pamphlet, 1988), 55;
also see Jack Child, "The Status of South American Geopolitical
Thinking", in Atkins (90), 53.
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materials. As a result, the important process of nation-
building within the Southern Cone had scarcely gotten underway
when the German military missions arrived in Brazil. What
followed was a contradictory process of infusing the military
with the notion of sovereignty, while the civilian bureaucracy
and political elites' promotion of an economic relationship
with the First World served to limit the development of
civilian governments."
In Brazil the state's sovereignty came to be represented
by the military institutions, which pursued their own concept
of a national defense strategy. The Armed Forces of Brazil
became the guardians of the state and the symbol of national
identity. Despite a modernizing military, there is evidence
that attempts were made to make the transition from a
caudillo-based landed elite to a more democratic regime. The
repeated failure to make this transition left the military
institution as the only representative of national unity and
of the state itself. 76
Nationalism did not arrive in Brazil until the
professionalization of the military. The new military took
upon itself the banner of true national integration.
Governments of the Southern Cone were called on to function as
fully integrated states at a time when they could not even
"75see Atkins (89), 277.
"76see Rouquie (87), 62.
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indicate where their own borders lay, let alone protect them.
Brazil became an immense territorial power because its
neighbors could not contain its westward movement. But in
retrospect, the increase in Brazil's territory was not
representative of the strength of Brazil's political
institutions.
The military became the source of unity in preserving the
integrity of the territory, giving legitimacy to the very
existence of the state. Matters were complicated at the turn
of the century when the military institutions introduced
German ideology as the premiere form of professionalism. As
a result, the civilian bureaucracy remained poorly trained,
forcing the newly professionalized military into guaranteeing
the integrity of the state. In the twentieth century, as the
civilian government proved incapable of forming political
structures that could carry out the business of running a
modern state, the military took upon itself the mission of
developing the bureaucracy as well."
The National Security Doctrine (NSD) that emerged within
the Brazilian military tied the notion of nation-building to
national security. As Brazil increased its contacts with the
rest of the world it became quite obvious that its place in
the global hierarchy was not the one the military felt it
deserved. World War II had a contradictory affect on the
77see Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in
Military Brazil, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985).
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Brazilian military, changing the national security strategy
once and for all. While the war elevated Brazil's prestige
because of its participation with the United States, it also
made the Brazilian military aware of the gap between the
capacities of the two countries. This gap reinforced the view
in military circles that security could not be achieved
without linkage to economic and technological development.
Officers realized that to convert Brazil's military into a
modern one, they would first have to change Brazil. 7"
B. NATION-BUILDING AND THE SUPERIOR WAR COLLEGE
From the beginning, one of the goals of Brazilian
geopolitical theorists has been the education of elites. The
process has now been underway for over fifty years, starting
with Everardo Backheuser and the German military missions.
The most important aspect of Brazilian geopolitical education
has been its dual civilian-military application. The
education of elites has been accomplished both formally and
informally, in government colleges and through the media.
Geopolitical theorists like Travassos, Golbery and Mattos all
taught in military schools, but the greatest influence in
Brazil was the founding of the Escola Superior de Guerra
(ESG), the Brazilian National War College, in 1949.
78see Frank McCann, "The Brazilian Army and the Problem of
Mission, 1939-1964", Journal of Latin American Studies, no. 12, May
1980, 120.
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ESG sought to expose both officers and civilians to the
major economic and political problems facing the state. In
the 1950's students studied inflation and banking, among many
other economic topics. After graduation, its alumni
association served as the center for continued research, and
held regular meetings that gathered ESG graduates to discuss
key problems. There were two main themes behind the ESG's
doctrine. First, national security and development were
closely interrelated. According to Alfred Stepan; "National
security for the ESG was seen to a great extent as a function
of rationally maximizing the output of the economy and
minimizing all sources of cleavages and disunity within the
country."" This prescription called for a strong,
centralized state with a passive civilian sector.
The second theme that Stepan considers relevant in ESG's
doctrine is the ideological impact of the Cold War in shaping
the developmental needs of Brazil. Underdevelopment was
perceived as a potential source of political instability.
This notion was shared by the United States in its view of
Latin America during the Cold War. By promoting rapid
economic development along capitalist lines, the military not
"79see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics; Changing
Patterns in Brazil, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),
[hereinafter "Stepan (71)"], 179.
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only showed its support for the West, it also undermined the
appeal of communism for the underprivileged. 8"
The ESG has been the key link between geopolitical theory
and government action, yet it denies any official role in the
formulation of national policy. The school operates under the
Armed Forces General Staff, an advisory body to the President.
There are some significant differences between the ESG and the
United States' War College; first, the high proportion of
civilian students graduating from ESG (about one-half);
second, the emphasis on planning national policy along
domestic lines and not global strategic aspects; and thirdly,
the systematic updating of graduates on national security
development polices. The ESG is beginning to educate a fourth
generation of Brazilian military and civilian leaders; despite
official disclaimers the ESG continues to play an important
and significant role in focusing military strategy in
government planning."
The military, particularly the Army, continues to act as
the primary force behind geopolitics in Brazil. Today in
Brazil, education in geopolitics is primarily a government
80see Stepan (71), 180.
"
8 In an interview with the author in February 1993, Colonel
John Bevington, an ESG graduate and Director of the International
Army Directorate, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, Virginia, discussed the differences between ESG and
the U.S. War College curriculums; also see Lars Schoultz, National
Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987).
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enterprise. There seems to be an effort to de-emphasize the
impact of earlier geopolitical theorizing on developmental
plans in the Amazon region. The reasons for this phenomenon
are unclear, though they may include a change of academic
interest or part of a calculated effort to downplay
geopolitical theories to placate fearful neighbors. This
explanation would fit with initiatives developed with
Argentina during recent years, and Brazil's emphasis on public
cooperation with other countries in the Amazon Pact.
The emphasis on nation-building that ESG brought to
Brazil's foreign policy agenda reflects a set of aspirations
more complex than simply focusing on past balances- of-power
and spheres-of-influence. ESG graduates were looking at the
unfinished business of nation-building, primarily in the
Amazon, and its implications for Brazil's drive for great
power status. Portraying the Amazon as a threatened region
not only provides the military with a mission, it also
supports their call, argues for the modernization of equipment
and supports their goal of regional hegemony.
C. FORCA TERRESTRE 1990 (LAND FORCE 1990)
Nation-building in Brazil has been an uneven process; it
began with the professionalization of the military institution
but ended before reforming the civilian political structures.
In geopolitical terms, the professionalization of the military
strengthened the legal status of Brazil but contributed to the
58
pushing and shoving associated with power politics in the
region. "
The military regimes left a legacy of the subordination of
diplomacy to the geopolitical notions of state competition and
regional hegemony. The military institutions fostered the
image of the state struggling for survival, emphasizing
competition with neighboring countries rather than
cooperation. With the transition from authoritarian to
democratic rule, a new set of security variables became
paramount. In BraLil, this transition of power was achieved
through a negotiated process in which the military retained
significant power in the country's National Security Council
(CSN). As a result, the civilian government had been somewhat
timid in demanding institutional reforms. After President
Josd Sarney took office in 1985, the Brazilian military
announced its plan to embark on a costly new modernization
program to perform its newly defined role as the defender of
territorial integrity and democracy. General Rubens Bayma
Denys, the CSN secretary under President Sarney, announced
that Brazil had to be prepared to take action in the event of
border conflicts between neighboring countries. The program,
known as "Forga Terrestre 1990" (FT-90), entailed an annual
outlay of about $100 million, which would be used to purchase
missile launchers, helicopters, and cannons among other
82see Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in
razil, 1964-1985, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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equipment, and introduce new training courses for military
personnel."
FT-90 reflected the final aspect of Brazil's military
strategy of defending the long western and northern borders
shared with Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. Brazilian
officers used what was then the most significant threat to
justify the expense of conquering and defending the frontier
space. Their argument centered on the risk of spill-over from
neighboring states' guerrilla wars. The FT-90, was expected
to draw its weapon requirements from domestic sources, which
were operating at top capacity in fulfilling contracts with
oil rich Middle Eastern countries. 84
In addition to this program the military also created a
military zone in the western Amazon, reflecting the new
emphasis on external security. The army gained support from
the Ministry of Planning, which trimmed the budgets of other
ministries, such as interior, health and communication to pay
for the initial installments. The strengthening of the
northern borders became a welcome new political diversion for
the unemployed military leadership, who were in the process of
transferring governmental powers to civilian control. But in
83see "Army Set For Major Modernisation", Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, 3 January 1986, RB-86-01, 5; also see
"General Discloses Army Modernization Project", (in Portuguese), 2
Estado De Sao Paulo, 11 December 1985, 7, translated and reported
in FBIS, 16 December 1985, Dl.
84see "Armed Forces To Get U.S. $250m a Year", Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, 14 August 1986, RB-86-07, 5.
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a much broader sense, the announcement of the final phase of
Brazil's "geopolitical maneuvering" coincided perfectly with
the military's defense strategy. The plan authorized by CSN
was military in nature, but in Golbery's terms was the
"valuating" aspect of the Amazon's frontier space and a
important aspect of the military's grandeur strategy. The
Calha Norte project was designed by the military to serve as
a magnet for internal migration to the previously unoccupied
mineral-rich regions of the Amazon. In the future the
project's military aspects will fade, giving control of the
communities it creates to local leadership. 8 5  This will
release the military for the final time from its century-old
internal development mission, and allow it to focus on
controlling the entire region in the role of a hegemon.
85see Tarbutton (91), 21.
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VI. A NEW AGENDA FOR THE MILITARY"6
Significant changes are taking place within the armed
forces and in their relationship to civilian authorities in
Brazil. These new patterns are being shaped by new contacts
between representatives of the armed forces, elected
officials, and journalists. These relationships have also
affected the development of a new agenda in civil-military
relations. In the strengthening of the political structures
during the Collor impeachment crisis there was a broad
recognition by major political actors, and especially the
armed forces, that the 1988 Constitution was the legitimate
and proper guide for the management of political conflicts in
Brazil.9 " Therefore, the mission of preserving internal
order, as stated by the Constitution, has taken a secondary
position to the military's efforts of building a professional
identity through an external orientation as defined in the
national defense strategy.
86see Scott D. Tollefson, "The United States and Brazil:
Critical Issues in the Security Relationship", Department of
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 1 May 1992, 20. An unclassified report prepared for
the office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs, Inter-American Affairs.
"87see Julia Preston, "Brazil's President Steps Aside: Collor
Gives Up Rule to Face Senate Trial", The Washington Post, 3 October
1992, A13; also see "Collor Cliffhanger", Latin American Weekly
Report, 7 January 1993, WR-93-01, 3. Collor submitted letter of
resignation on 29 December 1992.
62
Turning to Latin America, one observes an interesting
variety of military action and inactions resulting form the
most recent wave of democratization. The Peruvian armed
forces, for example, were instrumental in President Fujimori's
autogolpe.8 8  In Venezuela, the military uprising in early
February 1992 was designed to remove the President; he was
accused of being negligent in fighting corruption and failing
to promote economic recovery. 8 9 General Pinochet remains as
commander of the Chilean military, imposing limits on
President Alwyn's control over the military institution.9"
In Paraguay, the presidential elections of May 1993, were
overseen by a military intent of ensuring a competitive race
while fighting charges of widespread of their own
corruption. 91 Only in Argentina has the civilian government
secured an acceptable civil-military relationship, with the
military subordinated by a set of laws enacted by Congress.
88see "Fujimori Strikes Against Congress: Wide Popular Support
for Military-Approved Self-Coup", Latin American Regional Reports-
Andean Group, 21 May 1992, RA-92-04, 2.
89see Georgie Anne Geyer, "Democracy Betrayed", World Monitor,
September 1992, 44.
90see Alan Angell, "What Remains of Pinochet's Chile?",
(Institute of Latin American Studies: University of London, 1992),
Occasional paper no. 3, 1.
91see "Cabinet Changes Not Due to Scandal: Fears for 1993
Elections as Top Brass Issue a Warning", Latin American Regional
Reports-Southern Cone, 24 December 1992, RS-92-10, 6; also see
"Colorado Crisis Fuels Coup Rumors", Latin American Regional
Reports-Southern Cone, 4 February 1993, RS-93-01, 3.
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A. INDICATORS OF CHANGE
The course of civil-military relations in Brazil has
changed remarkably in the last few years. For decades
Brazilians were accustomed to the cross-fire of accusations
and warnings between representatives of the armed forces and
the opposition forces. This confrontation was deeply rooted
in the mistrust concerning the other's intentions, with each
side believing the other incapable of participating in
democratic politics. Some scholars are now suggesting that
the demise of military-authoritarian regimes and the
subsequent consolidation of the democratic regimes are
actually part of the same developmental process. 92
In the 1990's, both the military and civilian political
segments have found common themes that are transforming their
respective political rcles. The collapse of the military
regime suggests that that form of governing became incapable
of providing political solutions to popular demands, losing
both legitimacy and popular support. At the same time, the
armed forces also lost their professional identity, as a
military fighting force, as it became more and more involved
92see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Crafting of
Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South
American Comparisons", in Robert A. Pastor (ed.) Democracy in the
Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1989), 41.
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in non-military activities through the years. 9' The military
was more concerned with developing and running the country
than with military preparedness.
The military's withdrawal from national politics took
place in several stages and over the course of several years.
The realization of the loss of their professional identity did
not occur overnight, nor were the causes clear to the
military's leadership. One hypothesis is that the return to
an emphasis on professionalism grew out of the demands of
junior officers who had grown uncomfortable with the reality
of having a hollow force, fragmented planning, and low
readiness. 94  As the leadership renovated itself these
concerns gained momentum through internal debate, and the
military took notice of its operational decay and began to
react. This reaction seems to have started with Argentina's
failure in the Malvinas' War in 1982, and was reinforced by
images from the high-tech Persian Gulf War in 1992. The
Brazilian political leadership refusal to take an active part
in the Gulf conflict probably resulted from its economic and
military connections to Iraq. This refusal caused Brazil's
military to lose international prestige, though the military
"93Each branch of the Armed Forces has been involved in what the
First World would consider non-military activities. The Army with
its road and nation-building projects in the Amazon; the Air Force
and its role in air traffic control and airport management; and the
Navy in commercial shipping supervision and ocean port activities.
94see Stepan (88), 55.
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ministers had desperately wanted to support the international
coalition with military forces. While still opposing a new
military agreement with the United States, the Brazilian
military has accused Itamarty of pursuing a hopelessly anti-
U.S. policy. 95
Another aspect of ideological change is the shift in
attitude toward the ideal political system for Brazil. Though
the armed forces have desired control of the political system
in the past, they now want only to sustain the stability of
constitutional rule in national politics. This shift has been
perceived as a return to the military's cherished belief that
the armed forces should act as a moderating force in national
political struggles, as opposed to assuming control of the
reins of power.96
The lower profile by the military was displayed during the
last presidential crisis. On 29 September 1992, the Brazilian
federal Chamber of Deputies voted to authorize the Senate to
initiate trial proceedings against Fernando Collor on charges
of corruption. The political struggle which followed, with
all its intense debate and popular emotional appeal, was
placed solely under the authority of the National Congress.
95see "Washington Letter, Anti-U.S. Policy", Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, 11 July 1991, RB-91-06, 8.
96see "Justice Minister Notes Absence of Military Role", (in
Spanish), EFE, 25 September 1992, 1643 GMT, translated and reported
in FBIS, LAT-92, 188, 28 September 1992, 18; also see "Collor Drops
most of Reform Proposals: Eye on the Military", Latin American
Regional Reports-Brazil, 24 October 1991, RB-91-09, 3.
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The military ministers clearly stated their intentions to
stand outside of the debates and abide with any decisions
reached by Congress. This act assured the political
disposition of a crisis which, in the past, would most
probably have triggered a military response; it is today
regarded as an unprecedented display of the military's
institutional maturity. 97
B. A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH SOCIETY AND CONGRESS
Brazil's civil-military relations are shaped today by a
new dialogue between representatives of the armed forces and
civil society. In accepting the new government and the
premise that national politics should be exercised within a
constitutional framework, the military is free to turn their
efforts to the needs of the services. These needs include
recuperating the purchasing power of salaries, the search for
budgetary means to sustain the principal programs underway,
the modernization of equipment
and tactics, and ensuring the correct political orientation
for the role of the armed forces in national defense. 9'
97see "Collor is Unseated by the Book: Will Franco become New
Version of Alan Garcia", Latin American Weekly Report, 24 December
1992, WR-92-50, 5.
98see "Text of Guidelines for Army High Command", (in
Portuguese), 0 Estado De Sao Paulo, 19 November 1992, 4, translated
and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 226, 23 November 1992, 28.
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Thinking about national defense strategy in a democratic
environment is a new concept for both the military and
civilian leadership. The 1988 Constitution calls for the
armed forces to maintain internal order and provide for
national defense. Given that the military has proven its
willingness to forgo intervention in national politics, more
attention can now be dedicated to Brazil's external defense
strategy. The military's search for political support and
legitimization of their national defense role began when
military commanders opened a dialogue with individuals and
organizations concerning military affairs."
The most important dialogue occurred in Congress. During
less than three ycars as ministers, all three military chiefs
in the Collor administration testified before Congress more
times than all their preceding colleagues combined. In the
Chamber of Deputies, the National Defense Commission has
become the main forum to debate the problems of military
planning, administration and budget. Over the course of many
sessions, the country has learned a great deal about the views
held by the military leadership, including the uncertainties
caused by changes in world politics, the risks derived from
their outdated equipment, potential threat areas, and the huge
budgetary difficulties faced by the military. In this
environment the military has sought to teach elected
"see "Military Resists Pressure to Play Anti-Drug Role", Latin
American Regional Reports-Brazil, 9 July 1992, RB-92-06, 8.
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representatives and the country about the status and
capabilities of the armed forces."° This teaching process
has been further extended through the publication of articles
written by military officers.
The results of this political move has established a new
channel of cummunication between the leadership in the armed
forces and members of both houses in Congress, showing that
the military is ready to step out from behind the
Executive,"°I but vastly more important is its increased
level of operational autonomy in developing the aspects of the
national defense strategy. The military finds itself in the
precarious position of distancing itself from the executive
branch while protecting its institutional structure in the
halls of Congress.
However, the critical strategic aspect of this new
dialogue is not the military's new willingness to openly
debate issues which it feels needs to be addressed; rather, it
is the issues that have not been brought up in open debate and
are therefore suspiciously absent from the new dialogue. For
the near term the military's grand strategy will not end up in
a Congressional hearing for public debate. In Brazil, inquiry
100see "Army General Views Defense Industry Prospects", (in
Portuguese), Tecnologia & Defesa, May-June 1992, 5-8, translated
and reported by FBIS, LAT-92, 227, 24 November 1992, 31.
101see "Military Frustrated by Lack of Funds: Complaints about
Obsolete Equipment, Shortages, Poor Pay", Latin American Regional
Reports-Brazil, 11 July 1991, RB-91-06, 4.
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into military policies is still only as deep as the military
allows, covering only support functions, such as personnel,
training, pay, and equipment. The military leadership on one
hand recognizes the need for congressional support for
institutional survival, while on the other hand is keeping the
real motivating strategy cloaked in darkness. The military is
playing a subtle game in its drive to sustain their grand
strategy in the Amazon, a strategy which is discussed in
greater detail in part three of this study.
C. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
An important theme in numerous political commentaries has
been the complaint of limited civilian oversight of the
military, and the lack of general guidelines for force
planning. In Brazil, military plans are still integrated from
the bottom up, with each service defining its own needs. In
the absence of a joint chief of staff, military planners
continue to define their own national priorities and allocate
their resources in support of their decision."'2
Since the early fifties, the Superior War College (ESG)
has reinforced the notion within the military organizations of
the need for development of a national plan that the
government would follow. At ESG, this idea was executed by
10 2see "Army Minister Upholds Creation of Defense Ministry",
(in Portuguese), Voz Do Brasil, 9 December 1992, 2100 GMT,
translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 238, 10 December 1992, 21.
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the national administration via the military regime. The
miliary leadership experienced some early successes. The most
important document was the National Strategic Concept, which
evaluated the international environment and generated a list
of perceived threats, hypotheses of war, and the potential use
of the armed forces in conflicts. Though required under ESG's
charter, there is no evidence that the National Security
Concept has been updated since the 1970s.
Without clear foreign threats to national integrity and
interests, the military's demands for political orientation
and resources seems to have faltered under other priorities in
the national political agenda. As a result, Brazil's
military budget has been steadily decreasing, reaching 0.6
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991, and
further dipping to 0.3 percent in 1993. The military argues
that these levels are much too low, and put the organizational
survivability of the military at risk. However, this spending
cap continues to be enforced by direction of the Executive's
economic officials. The military has begun to feel that
elected officials are not paying attention to their pleas and
begun to lobby strongly for their views elsewhere, provoking
debates on military issues among politicians, press, and the
academics. This process has served to legitimate their
positions and seeks a consensus in the government's budgetary
decision-making processes.
71
In the Collor administration, the military did not find
the decision making support it expected from the Secretariat
for Strategic Affairs. As Collor consolidated power, he
brought what was left of the former National Intelligence
Service (SNI), and the National Security Council (SADEN) into
a single Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) under the
office of the presiaency. In March of 1991, most of the
military officers were purged by SAE's civilian leadership,
who turned most of the organization's efforts to the problems
of economic development. Most importantly, Collor reinforced
civilian rule by curbing the entrenched political power of the
army. This may have been the final straw for the military, in
part explaining the strong lobbying efforts by the armed
forces to regain control of SAE under the Franco
administration.°103
Another general theme in the public commentary is the
misunderstood arms production and arms transfers situation,
and its role in strategic planning. The evolution of Brazil's
arms transfers policies, (guns for oil) follows the previously
described logic based on the country's increasing demand for
oil. The primary result of this increasing demand will
103see "Overview of SAE Structure, Activities", (in
Portuguese), 0 Globo, 2 June 1991, 10 , translated and reported in
FBIS, LAT-91, 128, 3 July 1991, 21; also see "Collor Not All Bad",
Latin American Regional Reports-Brazil, 22 October 1992, RB-92-09,
8.
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probably be future arms transfer agreements with more Middle
Eastern countries, specifically Iran."0 4
A brief review of the dilemma facing the military's
leadership on how to structure the armed forces in the absence
of general guidelines, sheds considerable light on the
question of Brazil's national strategy and the issues that
have yet to be confronted. While there is general agreement
that there is a need for technology modernization in the armed
forces, the degree of technological update needed and its
distribution throughout the force structure are not yet clear.
For example, Brazil continues in its development and
construction of a nuclear powered submarine at the Navy's
request. With unusual support from Congress, a multi-year
budgetary allocation continues to be approved. Under strictly
military considerations, it is easy to understand the
operational advantages of a nuclear submarine over
conventional ones, especially considering Brazil's long
Atlantic coastline. Nevertheless, it is still not clear what
benefits such capability would provide for the naval force and
for Brazil's security. Military application is apparently not
the primary consideration in the decision to develop nuclear
powered submarines; Brazil has decided to acquire the
industrial know- how for building this type of platform, and
104see "Visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati", (in
ersian) Tehran Voice of The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2030 GMT 16
ebruary 1993, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-93, 031, 18
ebruary 1993, 23.
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the political decision has been made to bring submarine
production and deployment into full operation."'°
Brazil's military equipment, such as patrol boats, combat
aircraft, artillery pieces and air defense missiles, are not
just outdated, but numerically insufficient even for training
purposes. The situation is further exacerbated by the lack of
spare parts, fuel, and ordnance needed to ensure proper
readiness levels. Another issue is the destiny of Brazil's
indigenous arms industry.I' 6  The technological and
commercial successes of the Brazilian arm industries, in both
local and international markets, started in the mid-1970s.
Beginning in the late eighties, however, Brazil began to lose
its foreign markets. The end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf
War, and the general surplus of arms in the world market, all
contributed in this downturn. This cut off Brazil's primary
source of oil. Brazilian arms manufactures, such as EMBRAER,
ENGESA, and AVIBRAS, went deep into debt, teetering on virtual
bankruptcy."0 7  The national arms industry had symbolized
Brazil's determination to become a world power and reduce
°
05see Jose Casado, "Policy Priorities of Military Ministers
Viewed", (in Portuguese), Gazeta Mercantil, 9 October 1992, 1-6,
translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 209, 28 October 1992, 40.
106see Roberto Godoy, "Financial Situation of Material Industry
Viewed", (in Portuguese), 0 Estado De Sao Paulo, 15 November 1992,
17, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 223, 18 November 1992,
30.
107see "Troubled EMBRAER Slashes Workforce: Slimmer but
Stronger for Next Year's Privatization", Latin American Regional
Reports-Brazil, 9 July 1992, RB-92-06, 6.
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foreign political dependency; now the industry is searching
for partnerships with foreign companies in an effort to
survive. In the absence of a national security concept, it is
the military that will try to decide which industries are tied
to the symbols of national power, providing institutional
support for their survival in the marketplace."°"
D. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The military still has a lot of institutional power and
uses it to further its vision of Brazil's grand strategy.
During the Cold War, the Brazilian military's most credible
mission was the defense of the continent under U.S.
leadership, and fighting internal rebellion. In the 1990's,
new internal and external scenarios are beginning to appear,
however, which are finding the political and military
structures unprepared.
International pressures to preserve the Amazon's tropical
environment have been identified by the military as Brazil's
highest threat, and it convincingly argues that coercive
measures could one day be used against the country. A related
problem in the Amazon region is the permeability of borders,
'
08see Defense and Foreign Policy: Strategic Policy, Table on
World Arms Transfers, 31 December 1992, 18. Brazil received the
first of fourteen AMX fighters from AMX International, an Italian-
Brazilian conglomerate, in May 1992; also see "National Company to
Export AMX Airplane Parts", (in Portuguese), 0 Globo, 14 November
1992, 31, translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-92, 222, 17 November
1992, 17.
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with natives Indians, migrants, smugglers, mineral
prospectors, and drug traffickers fighting federal
control.'" In these wide areas, the presence of the armed
forces is one of the few symbols of State presence. Thus, the
occupation of the Amazon region has become a prime area for
military planning, provoking the costly deployment of forces
to border areas, new military training, and the purchase of
new equipment. This part of Brazil's military's strategy may
inadvertently be leading the country down a path that will
prove destabilizing to region's political and economic
stability.
The converging forces in Brazil are fostered by
geopolitical theories and represent the need for a legitimate
military mission. These forces are attempting to mesh at a
time of political uncertainty, economic hardship and as a wave
of nationalism sweeps over the country. The process of
regional integration is the most vivid challenge. If Mercosur
becomes a success, the member countries must coordinate their
foreign policies, which implies closer defense policy
orientation. If the regional project fails, the assignment of
blame will tarnish regional trancuility and may provoke
another period of regional mistrust. As long as Brazil
maintains a comfortable stand in the international security
109see "Garimpeiros Back", Latin American Weekly Report, 7
January 1993, WR-93-01, 12. The newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo
reported that 11,000 gold miners have again invaded the Yanomani
Indian reservation.
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environment, the political system has enough breathing room
that it does not feel pressed to produce a defense policy that
kowtows to the aspirations of the professional military. Nor,
under the pressures of economic difficulties, will elected
officials allocate scarce financial resources and political
support for military force. However, the armed forces have
reached society with a new dialogue on subject matters with
which civilian politicians are not knowledgeable. The
military does not seek operational information, but rather the
resources and autonomy to control its own force structure and
grand strategy. Such control points towards the Amazon Basin.
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VII. A GRAND STRATEGY OR SECURITY DILEMMA"*0
The debate concerning regional rivalry for leadership and
the military's national search for security, power, prestige,
and resources continues today in the Southern Cone. Sub-
regional politics have brought strategic geopolitical
components into play. The vast Amazon Basin, until recently
largely undeveloped, has traditionally formed a physical
barrier between Brazil and most of its neighbors. In the
Southern Cone this barrier offered the separate states limited
protection and political autonomy. At the same time it
impeded trade and inter-state association. In the 1960's the
Brazilian military recognized the limitations of relying
solely on a fluvial strategy and began constructing the
transnational highways and railroad networks. The cpening of
Brazil's interior simultaneously linked the entire region,
facilitated trade, and rejuvenated Brazil's long-term
obsession that an industrialized country or international
organization might attempt to take over the Amazon. In
strategic terms the Brazilian government viewed the
colonization of the Amazon as the answer to its national
•1°see Michael C. Desch, "Transitions to Democracy: The Role of
the Militaries", in a paper presented at the Center for
International Studies, University of Southern California, 12 July
1991, [hereinafter "Desch (91)"]. The author has drawn heavily
from this paper and is indebted to this previous work by Michael
Desch.
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security concerns. Loss of the Amazon to international
control would represent the final blow to Brazil's dreams of
Manifest Destiny and great power status. Consequently,
Brazil's military accepted the mission of developing and
integrating the Amazon as its highest priority."'
A. PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S MILITARY STRATEGY"'
2
The earliest analysis of the role of the military in
Brazil's strategy development reflected the traditional belief
that the military was a threat to democracy. This trend in
theorizing was intended to examine the military's so-called
black box by focusing on institutional and organizational
structures. This research identified the two primary factors
that were responsible for shaping military institutions and
their subsequent strategies. These two factors were the
functional imperative, or its mission, and the societal
imperative, or its role in the political processes of the
state." 3  It was subsequently determined that the key
variable for both these functions was the overarching threat.
111see Alan Riding, "Brazil to Set Up Bases on Borders", New
York Times, 1 November 1986; also see Nigel J.H. Smith, Rainforest
Corridors, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982),
9.
"112see Stepan (71), 55; also see Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces
and National Modernization: Continuing the Debate", Comparative
Politics, vol. 16, no. 1, October 1983, 2.
13 see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation, (Cambridge: The
Belkamp Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 2.
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Threats were determined to vary in source, external or
internal, and in intensity, high or low. Thus, the source of
a threat determined the particular type of military doctrine
while the intensity resulted in greater or lesser military
cohesion. The conclusion was that a combination of a specific
type of doctrine with its corresponding level of cohesion
determines the orientation of the military's strategy." 4
As discussed earlier in this study Brazil's military was
modernized and professionalized through European exchanges.
The European militaries were exporting a brand of
professionalization which was derived from an environment
where the threat was extensively external. This was in direct
contrast to the Brazil's geopolitical situation at the turn of
the century. This is not to say that the Brazilian military
had no external missions but rather that their primary
orientation was internal.115  Brazil's military leadership
may have understood the nuances of the European defense models
but became consumed by the internal domestic and social
demands of the state. In accepting the missions of internal
security and nation-building over an external orientation the
Brazilian military was tied to a strategy it could not
control. This orientation was critical, because externally-
"114see Desch (91), 20.
11see Rouquie (87), 98; also see Alfred Stepan, "The New
Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion",
in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Armies and Politics in Latin America,
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976), 246.
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oriented armies do not usually rule, and internally-oriented
armies do not usually fight externally.I"6
There exists a proven incompatibi lity between the internal
and external uses of military force. Quite simply the more
often the armed forces are used internally the less capable
they become of waging war externally. This is the case for
two reasons. First, the time and resources spent training on
one of these mission is not transferable to the other; and
second, armed forces used in an internal role do not enjoy a
high level of popular support that is required for external
operations."'
The historical internal orientation of Brazil's military
has been a continual threat to civilian rule because military
strategies linked internal economic development to military
missions. This was clearly the case in the development and
priorities of the national security doctrine at ESG. The key
characteristics of this strategy was its domestic focus and
extremely broad definition of national security."'
These internally-oriented strategies were an important
factor in the military's seizure of power in 1964 because they
provided the framework in how the military could rule. The
116see Alexander Barrus, "The Risk of Intervention Gone?", in
Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial (90), 178.
117see Guillermo O'Donnell, Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1986), 43.
"118see Stepan (71), 168.
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key element of any strategy is the intensity of the threat,
which conveniently correlates into the level of cohesiveness
i-n military institutions."' The most persuasive arguments
why Brazil's miliary intervened into government has been that
it was in the military's own institutional interest to do so.
This underscores the significant level of military autonomy in
Brazil. It was this same aspect of operational autonomy that
surrounds Brazil's contemporary military strategy in the
Amazon. 120
The Brazilian military seriously began to reassess its
external security situation following the Falklands/Malvinas
War. The military not only concluded that there were
legitimate external threats, but that there internal
orientation was not capable of achieving their goals. Given
that military unity is the strongest when threatened from
without and when considered the relative ease in forging a
consensus among military officers on the threat in the Amazon,
herein lies the core of Brazil's current national defense
strategy.
What has been much more problematic for the military was
arriving at a consensus on specific branch (Army, Navy, and
Air Force) missions and the resourcing of these missions. The
119see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Crafting of
Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South
American Comparisons", in Pastor (89), 51.
120see George Philip, The Military in South American Politics,
(Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm, 1985), 180.
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Brazilian miliary continues to operate without a single core
or unifying structure. Each branch of the services competes
independently for resourcing, equipment, and doctrine
development. Traditionally the Navy and Air Force ministers
have been hesitant to act in joint ventures with the Army
given its preeminence. All this is changing today in Brazil.
As the military nears the final completion of its nation-
building mission, its internal strategy orientation towards
the development of the Amazon will end. When the entire
country has been intergraded through the geopolitical theories
of earlier military thinkers the military strategy will change
its emphasis towards an external orientation. This external
strategy should increase Brazil's interest in the Caribbean,
the South Atlantic, the Antarctica, and the West coast of
Africa.
B. BRAZIL'S MILITARY STRATEGY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMAZON
7oday Brazil is geographically divided into military
regions, each with its own military headquarters. In the
Amazon region, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force each have
military headquarters. The Army in particular has
concentrated on supporting the Federal government's efforts to
integrate the Amazon region with the rest of the country. The
mission of the Military Command of the Amazon (CMA) is to
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provide both internal and external security and ensure the
development of the area."
The first portion of this mission statement, providing
security, is a similar requirement for all of Brazil's
military regions. Of course, the geography, troops, and
facilities are different for each region, but the task is
basically the same throughout Brazil. It is the second part
of the mission statement this study considers significant;
development of the Amazon basin. The military commanders in
the Amazon are specifically tasked to guarantee the
continuation of the nation-building process as a military
operation.
This additional mission translates into numerous
individual and unit level tasks needed to be planned, funded,
and executed by a limited number of staff officers. In the
headquarters of the CMA very little time and energy is
dedicated to actually planning for the defense of the region.
In contrast, the vast majority of effort is consumed in the
non-military aspects of nation-building. These tasks include
the establishment of outposts; constructing and maintaining
roads; providing public health services; and in teaching
elementary and secondary level education courses. The
government's official response to these non-military
requirements has always been that the use of military units is
121see Azevedo (92), 23.
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beneficial because the skills of the individual soldiers are
being honed and expanded by operating in a hostile
environment, the Amazon basin.
This study proposes that the Amazon basin is the current
but not the final goal of Brazil's national defense strategy.
The military's perceived preoccupation with the Amazon is the
final phase of an extremely long-term mission given to the
military to develop and integrate the country. The widely
supported perception of an existing threat to the Amazon, or
the internationalization of the Amazon, continues to receive
plenty of attention throughout Brazil. Many of Brazil's
senior military officers believe that the sovereignty over the
Amazon is actually threatened and are calling for Brazil to
prepare to defend itself against the perceived imminent
foreign invasion. Interestingly, this argument for the
defense of the Amazon always includes a lengthy list of more
troops, equipment, and weapons for the military, as the
military attempts to dip into the public coffers."'
The military is using the increasingly popular perception
of an existing threat to further its cause. According to
retired General Oswaldo Muniz Oliva, former commander of ESG,
"Time is short and we need to join forces to defend
ourselves". With the collapse of communism, the military has
lost its most viable threat and one that kept the military
122see Jornal Do Basil, 21 September 1991.
85
equipped and trained. Today in Brazil, the armed forces have
substituted the "Green" threat for the "Red" one. 23
It is crucial to recognize, however, that the Brazilian
military has removed itself from its past role of political
interventionism. Today if the Brazilian military cannot
convince the public or the congress of their intentions in the
Amazon, their strategy risks the danger of being misunderstood
or unsupported, and in Brazil the development and integration
of the Amazon is one of the only projects that provides
sustained resources. This is not to imply that the military
institutions are not aware of regional or even global events,
only that in successfully accomplishing the mission of
integrating the Amazon the military is seeking the final
release from their time-honored internal orientation.
The issues of acceptability and proportionality are at the
heart of Brazil's national defense dilemma. Brazil's military
strategy will become credible only when the decision-makers in
Congress accept and fund the components of such a strategy and
the military is still unprepared to openly provide the details
of its strategy. Over the last few years, the president has
lost his ability to influence the military institutions
through power sharing and the public has begun to be aware of
the issues at stake. Brazil's military will not be able to
123see Veia, 11 September 1991.
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adopt a grand strategy unacceptable to the public or its
representatives in the future.
A cohesive military strategy has many facets and
components and by no means does it consist of only a political
position. The procurement of military hardware has little to
do with diplomacy, which is necessary, but cannot be a
substitute for a strategy. The current lack of a coherent
grand strategy in Brazil, however, is based on political
circumstances. Because of this lack of inner cohesion and
trust between institutions, Brazil is currently incapable of
producing a broad strategy. An important aspect of Brazil's
new military leadership is their recognition that in countries
with democratic constitutions everyone must be able to engage
in compromise and consensus building. In Brazil, consensus is
difficult to achieve and confusion abounds with worst-case
scenarios seemingly emerging from every sector.
C. BRAZIL AS AN ASPIRING HEGEMON1 2'
This portion of the study represents the culmination of
the research and analysis on Brazil's national defense
strategy. As previously noted Brazil's military strategy
remains unpublished, and therefore, must be reconstructed
through the process of piecing together a complex and
124see Myers (91), 225; also see Stephen G. Walker (ed.), Role
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1987), [hereinafter "Walker (87)").
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fragmented picture. This process involves a partial revealing
of how Brazil, as an aspiring regional hegemon, pursues its
strategy goals. The research sought to describe how Brazil's
military built upon the perceived threat in the Amazon as a
best-case selection of possible strategic responses. Reduced
to its most basic ingredients, the struggle to define Brazil's
strategy consists of two basic elements; national objective to
be achieved and the means for achieving them. One expert has
proposed a number of factors that have shaped Brazil's
emphasis on its regional role perception and the formulation
of a plausible threat, as in the Amazon. Once conceptualized,
this threat was internalized and a strategic response was
selected and sold to the public. Brazil's strategic response
has been to encourage regional economic integration and
regional developments under Brazilian leadership with an eye
towards regional hegemony."'2
This change in the political orientation of the government
tends to be followed with subsequent changes in military
orientation in the area of strategic definition. Thus, Brazil
as an aspiring hegemon selected the strategic response of
initiating integration under their new leadership. Similarly
Brazil redeployed its army following Argentina's use of force
in the Falklands/Malvinas island dispute, and announced the
12 5see Walker (87), 265.
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Calha Norte and FT-90 programs for military modernization in
the late 1980's.
Traditionally, public opinion resists rapid changes in how
national strategies are defined, further hindering the
military's willingness to reveal its national strategy. The
dilemma is that democratic leaders are not against the
military's desire for regional hegemony but openly cannot
support such a strategy. Therefore, in order to gain mass
support, the military must exaggerate the threat by assigning
its highest priority to the efforts of further integrating the
country through their Amazon strategy. This dilemma
encourages Brazil to attempt to implement clandestine policies
that lack broad public support. Not surprisingly, it has
proved almost impossible to keep these plans secret and once
they are officially discovered, it paralyzes the strategy's
capability of success.
In summary, this study's framework implies that Brazil's
decisions to either emphasize or downp:ay its role is linked
to the pursuit of regional influence and is driven by
geopolitical considerations. Earlier analysis confirmed that
the geopolitical structure of Brazil had a direct impact on
policy decision and is leading Brazil to act in the capacity
of an aspiring regional hegemon. In this context, Brazil's
specific policy goals are designed to dominate regional
organizations. Based on the assumption that their influence
is the greatest within the region, Brazil prefers resolving
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disputes in institutions where they enjoy the lion share of
control (such as - Mercosur, Merconorte, Amazon Pact, and
Andean Pact)." 26
Brazil's relative strength and size influences its choice
of political roles within the Southern Cone. The greater its
economic advantage over its neighbors, the more likely it is
to assert economic policies into its regional leadership
strategy. When contrasted with its pursuit of military or
political advantage, Brazil has encountered less opposition
when it emphasizes strictly economic leadership. This concept
of increasing economic influence appears to have reinforced
Brazil's decision makers with the perception that there is an
even greater role for them to play in other regional matters.
It is a relatively short step for Brazil to begin formulating
polices designed to consolidate their regional influence."12
126see Wolf Grabendorff, "Interstate Conflict Behavior and
Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America", Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 24, no. 3, August
1982, 285.
12 7see David J. Myers, "Brazil: The Quest for Leadership", in
Myers (91), 225.
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VIII. TOWARDS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Regional geopolitical systems have further crystallized as
theorists grapple with the terms and corresponding position of
states in this new international arena. During the Cold War
the world was divided into geographic regions that represented
the battleground for global competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The decline in superpower
influence has permitLed regional states to pursue long-
suppressed hegemonic aspirations. Regional hegemons, by
definition, are states that possess sufficient power to
dominate a subordinate state system. One expert explains that
the role selection of states aspiring to regional influence is
one of a leader and protector. In this context, aspiring
hegemons pursue a broad range of strategies to discourage
superpowers from projecting power into their region, thereby
assuring their dominant position within the region."2'
It is common for aspiring hegemons to overstate threats.
In Brazil the threat to the Amazon is often overstated for
this same reason. In the Southern Cone there are vacant
borders between states that have had almost no diplomatic
relations. Toward such a neighbor, Brazil might seek to act
in a non-alarmist manner, while consolidating Brazil's sphere-
128see K.J. Holsti, "Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy: Making
the Case for Role Analysis", in Walker (87), 8.
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of-influence. The overstated military threat still presents
the clearest and easiest avenue for Brazil's military to
mobilize popular support for their modernization programs.'29
A number of scholars over the past decade have predicted
increasing possibilities of regional conflict among South
American nations. They often point to the Beagle Channel,
Falklands/Malvinas war, Antarctica, the New River triangle,
northern Chile, and the Gulf of Venezuela as potential strife
areas. Several explanations have been presented, all of which
have traces of geopolitical theory, and are increasingly
applicable to Brazil as it formulates its external strategy in
the role of a regional hegemon. Most scholars maintain that
population growth, immigration, scarcity of resources, and new
technology are making previously vacant territories
significantly more important throughout the Southern Cone and
stirring up competition among neighboring nations that have
only vaguely defined their national borders. The results
could be increasingly sharp territorial disputes and a region-
wide renewal of national and political inflexibility."13
The relationship between the United States and South
America is also changing. The most significant change is the
129see Margaret G. Herman, "Foreign Policy Role Orientations
and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decisions", in Walker (87), 124;
also see Robert Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", Orbis, vol.
21, no. 3, Fall 1977, 623.
130see Howard T. Pittman, "Harmony or Discord: The Impact of
Democratization on Geopolitics and Conflict in the Southern Cone",
in Kelly and Child (88), 30.
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world-wide contraction of U.S. power, and its notable
preoccupation with the Middle East, representing a new
opportunity for independence within the Southern Cone. Most
experts would agree that Brazil will play a dominant role in
South America, leading into the twenty-first century. Many of
those experts, however disagree on the definition of Brazil's
national defense strategy."3' It is the author's opinion
that the Brazilian military are positioning themselves to
assume a hegemonic role in the Southern Cone, similar to the
influence held previously by the United States and the
British.
A. BRAZIL'S CHANGING NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY1 3 2
Recently, Brazil has experienced a series of economic
difficulties: foreign debt, trade deficiencies, slower growth
rates, energy scarcities, and demographic imbalances. They
seem to have convinced Brazilian political leaders that
internal regional development may offer a promising path
toward recovery. For this, its leaders apparently believe
... n numerous interviews with different action officers within
the Department of Defense with the author in February 1993;
Brazilian defense experts acknowledged Brazil's inherent position
within the Southern Cone, but differed significantly when defining
Brazil's national defense strategy - most simply stated that one
did not exist.
132see Philip Kelly and Jack Child, "Geopolitics, Integration,
and Conflict in the Southern Cone and Antarctica", in Kelly and
Child (88), 1. The author has drawn heavily from this chapter and
is indebted to the previous work of Philip Kelly.
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Brazil must integrate its hinterland with its coastal areas,
expand trade with Third World countries, and integrate the
Amazon basin region (states). Such a policy stresses
cooperation within the Southern cone on various projects
designed to resolve problems that transcend national
borders."'
In the case of Brazil, successful integration requires
careful, low-keyed, non-threatening diplomacy. This appears
to be precisely the formula used by Brazilian policy-makers
during the past few years. Similarly, Brazil intentionally
has kept its armed forces relatively small and in low profile.
Additionally, Brazil has taken the Third World stand on
economic issues and it generally has de-emphasized political
matters in preference for cooperative economic ventures with
neighboring countries."' Consequently, integrationist
approaches, which Brazil seems to have adopted, have laid the
foundation for the new era of Brazil as a regional hegemon.
The goal of a hegemon is to extend political and economic
influence beyond national borders and to assert regional
leadership. Among the many descriptions of Brazil's role in
the South American political system, clearly that of a hegemon
13see Kelly and Child (88), 9.
134see Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Southern Cone
Subsystem", in G. Pope Atkins (ed), South America into the 1990's:
Evolving International Relationships in a New Era, (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 87; also see Roett, Orbis, (82),
264.
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is not inappropriate. A hegemonic nation can be depicted as
a stabilizer, integrator, and leader, rather than as a
territorial imperialist. In this context, regional hegemorls
are characterized by: (1) the strongest military and economic
power of an area; (2) the primary designer and enforcer of the
political and economic rules of the game as recognized by the
region's other members; (3) and the guarantor of territorial
integrity and national independence. In these respects a
hegemon aims for order, regardless of whether it is oppressive
or cooperative in nature."'
In the category of military potential, Brazil easily
surpasses the other South American states. However, since the
turn of the century Brazil has usually maintained a non-
belligerent stance towards its neighbors, despite Brazil's
significant military potential. Experts have suggested that
this low-keyed armed forces presence helps legitimize Brazil's
leadership role in the economic and diplomatic areas; a modest
defense force poses little threat to neighbors or allies." 6
In the area of economic potential, Brazil again leads its
South American neighbors by a substantial margin in the areas
of industry, technology, national resources, transportation,
and communications. However, the most convincing example of
135see Myers (91), 286.
136see Michael G. Manwaring, "Brazilian Military Power: A
Capability Analysis", in Wayne A. Selcher (ed), Brazil in the
International System: The Rise of a Middle Power, (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Pre3s, 1985).
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Brazil's drive for coiitinental hegemony is seen in its recent
moves toward relaxing Southern Cone tensions and cooperating
in regional development. Sharply reversing its traditional
aloofness toward hemisphere affairs since the 1940's, recently
Brazil has initiated a variety of cooperative policies towards
its regional neighbors: rapprochement with Argentina;
sponsorship of the Amazon Pact, Mercosur and Merconorte;
presidential visits; heightened participation in multilateral
diplomacy; and joint development projects. Nevertheless,
Brazil has assertively used its diplomacy and armed forces
against potential subversion along its frontiers or in
pressing for settlement of disputes in which it possesses a
strong interest. These ventures in leadership, however, are
typical of a rising hegemonic state, a position towards which
Brazil is steadily moving.
B. BRAZIL'S MILITARY: A STRATEGY DILEMMA
There is a tendency within the Brazilian military to call
for increaseu military spending, with little regard to
Brazil's national defense strategy. In fact, there is little
debate among both civilian and military leaders concerning
that strategy. If the major purpose of Brazil's national
strategy is to defend the country by conventional means, then
it can be argued that what Brazil's military needs is not more
nuclear or space technology, but the appropriate numbers of
soldiers and equipment at a higher state of readiness.
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For example, a strategy based on a hypothetical threat to
the Amazon is one thaL requires a conventional warfare
response. In a defense against foreign intervention in the
Amazon region, a few nuclear-powered submarines or ballistic
missiles would be virtually insignificant.
If one accepts a conventional defense strategy, the first
priority should be personnel - both their quantity and quality
(education, training, and individual skills). The second
priority should be equipment (boots, guns, tanks, and
aircraft). These are not necessarily high-cost items in
comparison to the costly research and development programs
into high technology weapons systems. In sum, the Brazilian
military can achieve the goal of defending its sovereignty
through conventional means.
C. CONCLUSION TO BRAZIL'S CHANGING STRATEGY
In most cases, Brazil was quite successful in fulfilling
its policy objectives and in not arousing anti-Brazilian
sentiments. Although it may be premature to proclaim
Brazilian paramouncy in South America, these examples of
economic and military power and recent moves toward designing
and enforcing a new regional system suggest that such a
hegemonic presumption is on the rise. There are ample
motivations for Brazil to assume the leadership position with
the ending of the bi-polar world.
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The government of Brazil spends an inordinate amount of
time and thought on worst-case scenarios. This diverts
attention a,, y from early action to extreme and unrealistic
approaches to problems. Worst-case psychoses can be found in
Brazil's military strategy as well, where the most improbable
scenarios enjoy a large portion of the resources.
A primary example of worst-case psychosis is Brazil's
concept of national defense through nuclear and space
technology. In reality, these systems will add very little to
the military's overall ability to accomplish their
constitutionally directed mission of external defense.
Brazil's military strategy in this regard is flawed with an
error that could be perpetuated into the next century.
In conclusion, for the present and immediate future Brazil
will remain a strong contributor and enforcer of South
American stability. Among the Southern Cone countries Brazil
has the most to lose from regional strife, a situation that
would only damage its international prestige, economic
renewal, and internal development of the Amazon. With these
strong national interests at stake, Brazil possesses enough
incentive to project influence across the region. Its central
location, and improving transportation/communication network
further enhances these aspirations. South America is no
longer under external First World control, which makes it
feasible for Brazil to occupy the strategic vacuum that has
ensued. Additionally, Brazil's neighbors lack the unity or
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political power to form a bloc against Brazilian hegemony, and
in most cases the incentives for cooperating with Brazil
outweigh any advantages for opposing its hemispheric goals.
Brazil holds an increasing ability to influence policy
options throughout the Southern Cone. Brazil's present
foreign policies are stabilizing in nature and encourage
regional integration, but are based on Brazil's growing
hegemonic role. A period of Brazilian hegemony implies the
rapid development of interior regions, closer economic




This thesis examined a number of factcrs related to the
national defense strategy of b..azil, and its implications for
the twenty-first century. These factors include: (1) the
impact of earlier geopolitical thinking recast against the
aspects of contemporary regional economic integration, in an
era of reeling political uncertainties; (2) the military
institutions will choose play; and finally (3) Brazil's
strategy in developing the Amazon and subsequent aspirations
of occupying the position of South America's regional hegemon.
In concluding, the thesis will summarize the findings for each
issue.
Brazilian geopolitical thinking is an important
phenomenon, but one that is little understood outside of the
region. Its precepts are closely tied to deep currents of
nationalism and patriotism, that have a tendency to endure
regardless of regime type. While the original geopolitical
focus has changed from an initial emphasis on security to the
current emphasis on development and integration, this focus
could reverse itself in the future. Behind this development
and integration lies the greater vision of the military in
transforming Brazil into a major power, and in achieving
uncontested regional hegemony.
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Brazil is in the final stages of its grand "geopolitical
maneuver" in the Amazon. In the near term, however, the sheer
magnitude of the domestic social-economic demands have
dampened Brazil's bid for uncontested hegemony. Nevertheless,
Brazil has viewed South America as a region in which they are
destined to exercise the dominant influence.
A critical aspect of Brazil's national defense strategy
still not well understood is the tie between the military's
missions of nation-building and national security. Given that
in past years Brazil's War College enjoyed substantial
influence over the country's major economic and political
problems, the role of the military was much more clearly
defined. Today the influence of the War College in Brazil's
strategic planning has waned, with the exception of one issue
- the development and integration of the Amazon region. The
Amazon is a region that still demands the dual military
missions of nation-building and national security, and a
region where the military continues to act as the primary
force. The successful completion of the integration of the
Amazon should release the military from its century-old
primary focus of internal security and development to the
newer focus on regional hegemony. The remarkable changes in
Brazil's civil-military relations have supported and further
legitimize the military's role in this move to a primarily
external oriented national defense strategy.
101
The military still has substantial institutional power and
will use it to further its vision of Brazil's destiny. As the
military nears the completion of its nation-building mission,
its internal strategy towards the development of the Amazon
will end. When the entire country has been integrated through
the geopolitical theories of earlier planners, the strategy
will emphasize and focus more attention towards the Caribbean,
the South Atlantic, and the Antarctic.
As a result, Brazil's strategic response has been to
encourage regional economic integration and regional
development under Brazilian leadership. Brazil's political
leaders are not against the military's desire for regional
hegemony, but openly cannot support such a strategy. The
military enjoys virtual autonomy in implementing their
strategy. Future Brazilian hegemony implies increased
development of the entire Amazon region, closer economic
integration, and recognition of Brazil's regional power
status.
Brazil is realizing that it cannot attain major power
status by the end of the century. As a result, it is seeking
broader solutions to internal problems. Brazil recently has
opted for greater participation in South American economic
integration as indicated by the Amazon basin treaty, Mercosur,
and Merconorte. The completion of integration is driven by
Brazil's strategic vision and is the next logical step in the
military's national strategy towards regional hegemony. In
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this context, regional integration is simply one of many
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